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Abstract. Cryptography with quantum states exhibits a number of surprising and counterintuitive
features. In a 2002 work, Barnum et al. argued informally that these strange features should imply that
digital signatures for quantum states are impossible [6].
In this work, we perform the first rigorous study of the problem of signing quantum states. We first show
that the intuition of [6] was correct, by proving an impossibility result which rules out even very weak
forms of signing quantum states. Essentially, we show that any non-trivial combination of correctness
and security requirements results in negligible security. This rules out all quantum signature schemes
except those which simply measure the state and then sign the outcome using a classical scheme. In
other words, only classical signature schemes exist.
We then show a positive result: it is possible to sign quantum states, provided that they are also encrypted
with the public key of the intended recipient. Following classical nomenclature, we call this notion
quantum signcryption. Classically, signcryption is only interesting if it provides superior efficiency to
simultaneous encryption and signing. Our results imply that, quantumly, it is far more interesting: by
the laws of quantum mechanics, it is the only signing method available.
We develop security definitions for quantum signcryption, ranging from a simple one-time two-user
setting, to a chosen-ciphertext-secure many-time multi-user setting. We also give secure constructions
based on post-quantum public-key primitives. Along the way, we show that a natural hybrid method
of combining classical and quantum schemes can be used to “upgrade” a secure classical scheme to the
fully-quantum setting, in a wide range of cryptographic settings including signcryption, authenticated
encryption, and chosen-ciphertext security.
1 Introduction
The Internet of the future will plausibly include both large-scale quantum computers and high-capacity
quantum channels. How will we securely transmit (quantum) data over the resulting “quantum Internet?”
Methods based on entanglement (e.g., teleportation) are costly, using many rounds of interaction to build a
shared state which must be at least as large as the data itself. Classically, encryption and authentication offer
a non-interactive approach with several attractive features: (i.) keys exchanged over public channels, (ii.) a
short key suffices for transmitting unlimited amounts of data, and (iii.) security guarantees are maximal for
both secrecy and authenticity. Can we encrypt, authenticate, and sign quantum data to the same standard?
Classical digital signatures, for instance, are ubiquitous in everyday classical cryptography, with applica-
tions ranging from secure software distribution and email signatures to e-governance and cryptocurrencies.
Given their importance in the classical world, it is natural to ask whether it is possible to devise digital
signature schemes for quantum data. Unfortunately, this question has been considered in only one previous
work [6]. There, the authors only comment that, since any symmetric-key scheme that authenticates quan-
tum states must also encrypt them, quantum digital signatures must be impossible. They suggest that one
can use classical public-key cryptography and one-time quantum authentication to build a scheme they call
“public-key quantum authentication.” Unfortunately, no formal security definitions or proofs are given, and
the theory remains undeveloped. In this work, we return to the problem of signing quantum states, with
a rigorous and formal approach. We ask: are digital signatures for quantum states really impossible? Does
there exist any feasible tradeoff in the security and correctness requirements which makes them possible?
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1.1 Summary Of Results In This Work
Impossibility of quantum signatures. We first define quantum signature schemes, leaving as much room
as possible for achievable notions. We provide for the possibility of varying levels of correctness and very
weak forms of security.
Definition 1 (informal). A quantum signature scheme (or QS) is a pair (Sign,Ver) of keyed quantum
polynomial time (QPT) algorithms.
• A QS is correct for a map N if ‖N ◦ Vervk ◦ Signsk −N‖ ≤ negl(n).
• A QS is simply correct if it is correct for N = 1.
• A QS is ε-one-time-secure for a map L if, for every adversary A, the “attack map” L◦Verpk◦A◦Signsk
can be simulated (up to ε loss) by an algorithm which either applies L or discards the input.
Requiring correctness only for certain maps N , or security only for certain maps L, weakens the signature
scheme in that the (secure) further use of the verified state is limited. Note also that we have relaxed the
classical requirement that a signature is additional information that accompanies the message; quantumly,
this is impossible due to no-cloning. Instead, signing is allowed to transform the message into an arbitrary
state. Correctness requires that the message (or some partial information about it) can be recovered at
verification time.
We prove two strong impossibility results. First, we show that full correctness implies negligible security,
even in a very weak one-time sense which only guarantees the integrity of the outcomes of a single two-
outcome measurement. Second, if we fix a pair of measurements and then ask only for correctness and
security of their outcomes, then those measurements must commute.
Theorem 1 (informal). Let Π be a quantum signature scheme.
1. If Π is correct, then for any two-outcome measurement M , Π is at most (1− negl(n))-one-time secure
for M .
2. If Π is correct and ε-one-time-secure for a pair {M0,M1} of two-outcome measurements, then M0 and
M1 are indistinguishable from (1− ε)-commuting.
The measurement maps above are viewed as channels which measure and then output the outcome,
discarding the post-measurement state. This result shows convincingly that signature schemes can only sign
classical information.
Quantum signcryption. Our impossibility results appear to be devastating to prospects for public-key
cryptography with quantum data. They seem to imply that authenticated communication requires each pair
of parties to share a secret key. For networks with a large number of parties, or where parties frequently
come and go, this is an unwieldy and highly inefficient solution.
In the second part of our work, we show that this is in fact not necessary! The key observation is
that impossibility can be circumvented if we also encrypt the message. We can achieve this by, for each
transmission, selecting an intended recipient and encrypting using their public key. Classically, such combined
schemes are called signcryption, and are of interest only insofar as they provide efficiency gains over combined
encryption and signing [17]. This is in stark contrast to the quantum world: our results show that signcryption
provides the only way to achieve integrity and authenticity without a pre-shared secret key.
Definition 2 (informal). A quantum signcryption scheme (or QSC) is a triple of QPT algorithms:
1. (key generation) KeyGen(1n) : output (sdk, vek)← {0, 1}poly(n).
2. (signcrypt) SigEncsdk,vek : D(HM )→ D(HC)
3. (verified decrypt) VerDecvek,sdk : D(HC)→ D(HM ⊕ |⊥〉〈⊥|)
such that ‖VerDecvekS ,sdkR ◦ SigEncsdkS ,vekR − 1M ⊕ 0⊥‖ ≤ negl(n).
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In the envisioned usage, each party on a network first runs key generation, publishing their “verify/encrypt
key” vek while keeping their “sign/decrypt key” sdk private. When a sender S wishes to send a state σM
to a recipient R, they apply SigEncsdkS ,vekR using their private and the public key of R. When R receives
the signcryption %C , they apply VerDecvekS ,sdkR using their private key and the public key of S. Note that
“⊕0⊥” above indicates that this process of signcryption followed immediately by verified decryption (with
the correct keys) never rejects. We remark that the general definition for the multi-user setting will also need
to keep track of “user IDs” in order to prevent identity fraud.
Quantum signcryption security. Signcryption security is naturally divided into two settings, according to
whether the adversary has access to the private key of one of the parties (the sender or the recipient) or not.
First, outsider security ensures that, if S and R are honest parties, then their channel is private and
authenticated against adversaries from whom sdkS and sdkR are kept secret. Second, insider security ensures
that, if one party’s secret key is compromised, the security guarantees that are due to the other party’s
secret key still hold. If the sender key is revealed, the receiver should still enjoy full privacy. The other case
is quantumly unachievable: impossibility for signatures implies that releasing the receiver’s secret key results
in a useless scheme. In particular, quantum signcryption cannot provide non-repudiation.
Formally defining outsider and insider security for signcryption is a challenge quantumly: they are roughly
analogous to, respectively, authenticated encryption and chosen-ciphertext secrecy. Both of these notions
are quite troublesome in the quantum setting, since their usual definitions require the ability to make
comparisons between previous queries and outputs of the adversaries (e.g., in deciding if the adversary is
attempting to decrypt the challenge in IND-CCA2.) Fortunately, a recent approach [3] shows the way forward
on such definitions. The idea is to “split” the standard security game into two experiments: an “unrestricted”
experiment and a “cheat-detecting” experiment. More precisely, In the unrestricted experiment, an adversary
interacts with a signcryption and a verified-decryption oracle. In the cheat detecting experiment, the modified
signcryption oracle signcrypts half of a maximally entangled state and stores the other half together with the
plaintext submitted by the adversary. The modified verified-decryption oracle decrypts the ciphertext it is
presented with and checks sequetially whether it is in a maximally entangled4 state with one of the registers
stored by the signcryption oracle. If so, it returns the corresponding stored plaintext, otherwise it returns
the reject symbol. Following this approach, we formally define outsider signcryption security as follows.
Experiment 1. The real outsider experiment Out-Real(Π,A, n, S,R):
1: output ASigEncS,R,VerDecS,R(1n).
Experiment 2. The ideal outsider experiment Out-Ideal(Π,A, n, S,R):
1: define channel EM→C : prepare maximally entangled state |φ+〉M ′M ′′ , store (M ′′,M) in a set M; return
SigEncS,R applied to M
′.
2: define channel DC→M :
- apply VerDecS,R to C, place results in M
′
- for each (M ′′,M) ∈M: measure if M ′M ′′ are maximally entangled; if yes, return M
- return ⊥.
3: output AE,D(1n).
Security is defined as indistinguishability of the real and ideal worlds.
Definition 3. A QSC Π is outsider secure if for all QPTs A,
|Pr [Out-Real(Π,A, n)→ real]− Pr [Out-Ideal(Π,A, n)→ real]| ≤ negl(n).
For the relevant case of insider security (i.e., where the sender is the attacker) we define insider security
to be QIND-CCA2 security of the induced public-key quantum encryption scheme. While [3] only defines this
notion in the symmetric-key setting, we adapt it here to public-key schemes.
4 more precisely, whether it is in the standard maximally entangled state used by the modified signcryption oracle
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Constructions, security proofs. Finally, we give secure constructions for quantum signcryption. Along the
way, we also give several new security proofs of independent interest, for “bootstrapping” classical encryption
security properties to the quantum encryption setting. This is done via a generic classical-quantum hybrid
construction ΠHyb[Π,Σ] which combines a classical scheme Π with a quantum scheme Σ, as follows. The
key (or keys) for ΠHyb[Π,Σ] are the same as for Π. To encrypt %, we generate a key k for Σ and encrypt
% with k. Furthermore, we “encapsulate” k by encrypting it with Π and attaching the resulting classical
encryption to the encryption of %. Decryption first decapsulates the Σ-key, then uses it to decrypt the rest.
Theorem 2 (informal). Let Σ be one-time quantum authenticating (cQCA [3].)
1. If Π is post-quantum IND-CCA2 private- (resp., public-) key encryption, then ΠHyb[Π,Σ] is QIND-CCA2
private- (resp., public-) key quantum encryption.
2. If Π is post-quantum classical authenticated encryption, then ΠHyb[Π,Σ] is quantum authenticated en-
cryption.
3. If Π is post-quantum classical outsider- and insider-secure signcryption, then ΠHyb[Π,Σ] is outsider-
and insider-secure quantum signcryption.
2 Preliminaries
Notation, conventions. We will largely use the conventions regarding quantum information from [14]. We
use HM to denote a complex Hilbert space with label M and finite dimension dimM . A quantum register
is a physical system whose set of valid states is D(HM ). In our setting, a “quantum register M” is in fact
an infinite family of registers {Mn}n∈N consisting of p(n) qubits, where p is some fixed polynomial. The
notation τM will mean the maximally mixed state (i.e., uniform classical distribution) 1/dimM on M .
By “QPT” we mean a polynomial-time uniform family of quantum circuits, i.e., an efficient quantum
algorithm. Quantum algorithms implement completely positive (CP), trace-preserving (TP) maps, i.e., quan-
tum channels. To indicate that Φ is a channel from register A to B, we will write ΦA→B . When it helps to
clarify notation, we will use ◦ to denote composition of operators. We will also often drop tensor products
with the identity, e.g., given a map ΨBC→D, we will write Ψ ◦ Φ to denote the map Ψ ◦ (Φ ⊗ 1C) from AC
to D.
From now on, when mentioning a computational security notion for classical schemes, we mean it by
default in the post-quantum sense, that is, holding against QPT adversaries.
Quantum, classical encryption. We will assume basic familiarity with the usual classical constructions:
public-key encryption (PKE), digital signatures (DS), and signcryption (SC.) For the last item, we refer to [5]
for the basic theory. For us it will suffice to recall that one can construct a signcryption scheme by combining
a DS with a CCA-secure PKE via “encrypt then sign” [5]. The result is a signcryption scheme with outsider-
security and insider-security. We adopt the following notation for keys: (i.) dk = secret decryption key, (ii.)
ek = public encryption key, (iii.) sk = secret signing key, (iv.) vk = public verification key, (v.) sdk = secret
signing and decryption key, and (vi.) vek = public verification and encryption key. For quantum encryption,
we follow [2,3].
Definition 4. A public-key quantum encryption scheme (or PKQE) is a triple of QPT algorithms:
1. (key generation) KeyGen : on input 1n, outputs (ek, dk) $←−KE ×KD
2. (encryption) Enc : KE ×D(HM )→ D(HC)
3. (decryption) Dec : KD ×D(HC)→ D(HM ⊕ |⊥〉〈⊥|)
such that ‖Decdk ◦ Encek − 1M ⊕ 0⊥‖ ≤ negl(n) for all (ek, dk)← KeyGen(1n).
All the spaces have poly(n) bits or qubits; KE and KD are classical and C and M are quantum. We
assume w.l.o.g. that dk also includes ek, and ek also includes n. Setting ek = dk in the Definition 4 yields
symmetric-key quantum encryption (SKQE), letting Enc and Dec be classical algorithms yields PKE.
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Quantum security. We briefly review security for quantum encryption, i.e. encryption for quantum data.
The standard one-time quantum authentication notion is DNS, defined by Dupuis et al. [10]. Roughly speak-
ing, it states that for any attack map Λ the “effective map” EkDeck ◦Λ◦Enck is equivalent to a combination
of the identity and a “discard” map, along with some map on the adversary’s private space. It is well-known
that DNS only provides for authentication of the plaintext [3]. One can define a stronger notion, called quan-
tum ciphertext authentication (QCA) which prevents any adversarial modification of the ciphertext [3]. This
definition places further constraints on the simulator. While DNS and QCA are information-theoretic security
notions, it is straightforward to define variants which only require security against QPTs; we denote these by
cDNS and cQCA, respectively. All of these notions can be achieved with a simple scheme, as follows [1,10,3].
The key selects a random element Ck of the Clifford group. Encryption maps % to Ck%⊗|0n〉〈0n|C†k. Decryp-
tion undoes Ck, and rejects if any of the attached qubits yield a non-zero measurement. For ease of reference,
we restate the definitions of DNS and QCA in Supplementary Section C.1.
Basic secrecy (e.g., IND, IND-CPA, IND-CCA1) is straightforward to generalize to the quantum case. We
denote these notions (respectively) by QIND, QIND-CPA, and QIND-CCA1 [2,7]. For more advanced notions
like IND-CCA2 or authenticated encryption (AE), much more care is needed: the no-cloning theorem [14]
prevents classically straightforward tasks such as “remember this query so you can compare it to a later
output of the adversary.” Fortunately, a recent work showed that a solution is possible [3]. The idea is
to compare adversaries in two games: an “unrestricted game,” and a “cheat-detecting” game. To simplify
exposition, we will focus on the (weaker) plaintext security variants of the notions set down in [3]. This
means that we only check whether the adversary is attempting to cheat on the level of plaintexts. We attach
a “w” to the acronyms to indicate this distinction. In the final portion of the paper, we describe informally
how to extend all our results to the full, ciphertext-secure setting.
For chosen-ciphertext security, the unrestricted game is the usual CCA2 game with no restrictions on
the adversary’s use of the oracles (e.g., decrypting the challenge is allowed.) In the cheat-detecting game, we
substitute the challenge with half of a maximally entangled state, and store the other half so we can later
test whether the adversary attemps to decrypt the challenge. Security is defined in terms of the advantage
of adversaries between these two games. We call this notion QIND-wCCA2. For details, see Appendix B.1.
For authenticated encryption, in the unrestricted (or “real”) world, the adversary is given Enck and Deck
oracles and outputs a bit. In the “ideal” world, they are instead given modified oracles E and D. Here E
substitutes every input with half of a fresh maximally entangled state, storing the other half. Meanwhile,
D uses these stored states to test if the adversary composes E with D; if he does, D ensures the identity
results, and otherwise outputs ⊥. We call this notion wQAE. For details, see Appendix B.2.
3 Impossibility Of Signing Quantum States
3.1 Defining Quantum Signatures
We begin with a general definition of quantum signature schemes. (See Supplementary Section C.2 for a
discussion on quantum signature scheme definitions.)
Definition 5. A quantum signature scheme (or QS) is a triple of QPTs:
1. (key generation) KeyGen(1n) : output (sk, vk) ∈ KS ×KV.
2. (sign) Sign : KS ×D(HM )→ D(HC)
3. (verify) Ver : KV ×D(HC)→ D(HM ⊕ |⊥〉) .
Here, we have relaxed the classical requirement that a signature is an additional string that accompanies
the message; quantumly, this is impossible due to the no-cloning theorem. Instead, the signing algorithm
is allowed to transform the message into an arbitrary state, provided that the message (or some partial
information about it) can still be recovered at verification time. The key space KS×KV is a family of sets of
bitstrings of size poly(n), and that M and C are quantum registers of poly(n) qubits. In a typical setting,
the verification key vk will be public, while the signing key sk stays private.
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Since our goal is to show an impossibility result, we define correctness separately and permit schemes with
very weak guarantees on message recovery. Recall that a projector P defines a two-outcome measurement
channel N via N(X) = Tr((1− P )X)|0〉〈0|+ Tr(PX)|1〉〈1|.
Definition 6. A QS (KeyGen,Sign,Ver) is correct if it satisfies
‖Vervk ◦ Signsk − idM ⊕ 0⊥‖ ≤ negl(n) (1)
for all (sk, vk)← KeyGen(1n). More generally, given a finite set N of two-outcome measurements on HM ⊕
|⊥〉, we say that a QS is N -correct if it satisfies
‖N ◦ Vervk ◦ Signsk −N ⊕ 0⊥‖ ≤ negl(n)
for all (sk, vk)← KeyGen(1n) and all N ∈ N .
Definition 7. Let L be a finite set of two-outcome measurements on HM⊕|⊥〉. A QS is ε-one-time L-secure
if, for any QPT adversary A, for all L ∈ L there exists a probability p ∈ [0, 1] such that
‖L ◦ E [Vervk ◦ A(pk) ◦ Signsk]− pL+ (1− p)⊥‖ ≤ ε . (2)
Here, ⊥ denotes the reject map X 7→ ⊥Tr(X). The constraint (2) is essentially a weakened version of
the DNS security definition for the authentication of quantum states [9], adapted to the public key case.
It is weakened in three ways: (i.) we only ask for computational security, (ii.) the adversary does not hold
any side information about the plaintext, and (iii.) security only holds for the selected set of measurements.
Note that correctness and security are not required to hold for the same set of measurements. So, we could
in principle ask for a QS which is N -correct and L-secure for some N 6= L5; in practice, we are probably
primarily interested in N ∩ L. In any case, as we will show next, security cannot be achieved except for
trivial choices of N and L.
3.2 Impossibility Of Quantum Signatures
We begin with a technical lemma, characterizing quantum encryption.
Lemma 1 (generalization of Lemma B.9 in [4]). Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a PKE with exact
(approximate) correctness. Then Enc and Dec have the following form, for every keypair k = (dk, ek):∥∥∥Encpk − Vk ((·)⊗ (σk)T )V †k ∥∥∥ ≤ ε∥∥∥Decsk(VkPσkT V †k (·)VkPσkT V †k )− TrT [PσkT (V †k (·)Vk)PσkT ]∥∥∥ ≤ ε.
Here, σk is a state on register T , P
σk
T and P¯
σk
T is an orthogonal projector such that ‖PσkT σkPσkT − σk‖ is
negligible, Vk is a unitary operator and ε is neglible.
The proof is given in Appendix A. Note that the behaviour of Decdk can be arbitrary outside of the range of
VkP
σk
T V
†
k . The standard behavior is to output the reject symbol ⊥ when presented with an invalid ciphertext.
The Lemma gives an information-theoretic characterization of the channels Encpk,Decsk; this is why it’s ok
that V and σ are indexed by the keypair. This does not guarantee that Encek can be efficiently implemented
in this form: knowledge of ek alone is not enough to efficiently implement σk and Vk (otherwise it would
also be enough to decrypt!). In actual schemes, ek is enough to implement σk and Vk on relevant inputs for
encryption efficiently.
We will now show that a QS cannot be both correct and secure for a pair of measurements unless those
measurements commute, in the sense that their sequential application yields the same outcome distribution
5 Note however that for ε = negl(n), N ⊂ L, unless L = ∅.
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no matter the order. Recall that a measurement M also defines an instrument, i.e., a measurement map that
keeps the post-measurement state, by
M˜(X) = (1− P )X(1− P )⊗ |0〉〈0|+ PXP ⊗ |1〉〈1| (3)
In the following theorem, the composition of measurements is understood to mean that the instrument of
the first measurement is applied and the the second measurement acts on the post-measurement state of the
first one, i.e.
(M1 ◦M0)A→R0R1(XA) := (M1)A→R1
(
(M˜0)A→AR0(XA)
)
. (4)
The index of the outcome register R is tied to the index of the instrument, not to the order the measurements
are performed, i.e.
(M0 ◦M1)A→R0R1(XA) = (M0)A→R0
(
(M˜1)A→AR1(XA)
)
. (5)
Theorem 3. Let Π = (KeyGen,Sign,Ver) be a QS and {(M0)A→R0 , (M1)A→R1} be two-outcome projective
measurements with efficiently implementable instruments M˜i. Suppose Π is {M0,M1}-correct and ε-one-time
{M0,M1}-secure. Then
‖M1 ◦M0(%)−M0 ◦M1(%)‖1 ≤ ε+ negl(n) (6)
for all efficiently preparable quantum states %MR.
We remark that the commutation condition Equation 6 therefore holds whenever {M0,M1} ⊂ N ∩ L.
Proof. The plan is as follows. The scheme is correct for M0, the two-outcome measurement defined by a
projector P0. Using this, one can show that running the verification circuit (without discarding qubits,
and delaying measurements), applying the reflection unitary U = 1 − 2P0 and running the inverse of the
verification circuit, produces a valid signed state. More precisely, if the described attack is applied to a signed
state obtained from signing |ψ〉, the resulting state is a signed state that can be also obtained from signing
U |ψ〉. But if M0 and M1 don’t commute, then the unitary U changes the outcome of M1. Therefore the
measurements have to commute, up to an error equal to the soundness error ε.
We now explain the details. Assume for contracdiction that the conclusion of the theorem does not hold,
i.e. that there exists efficiently prepareable %MR such that
‖M1 ◦M0(%)−M0 ◦M1(%)‖1 > 2δ. (7)
Let |ψ〉MRE be an efficiently prepareable purification of of %MR. Let Pi be the projector for the outcome 0
of Mi, for i = 0, 1. The assumption (7) implies WLOG that
∣∣‖P0P1|ψ〉‖22 − ‖P1P0|ψ〉‖22∣∣ > δ2 . (8)
Define the reflection unitary Ui = 1 − 2Pi. Note that these unitaries are efficiently implementable via a
Stinespring dilation of the instruments M˜i. We would like to show that an application of U0 to |ψ〉 changes
the outcome of M1. We calculate∣∣‖P1U0|ψ〉‖22 − ‖P1|ψ〉‖22∣∣ = ∣∣‖P1(1− 2P0)|ψ〉‖22 − ‖P1|ψ〉‖22∣∣
= 2
∣∣2〈ψ|P0P1P0|ψ〉 − 〈ψ|P1P0|ψ〉 − 〈ψ|P0P1|ψ〉∣∣. (9)
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Now we use Equation 8 and rewrite the left hand side as∣∣‖P0P1|ψ〉‖22 − ‖P1P0|ψ〉‖22∣∣ = ∣∣〈ψ|P1P0P1|ψ〉 − 〈ψ|P0P1P0|ψ〉∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣〈ψ|P1P0P1|ψ〉 − 12 〈ψ|P0P1|ψ〉 − 12 〈ψ|P1P0|ψ〉
+
1
2
〈ψ|P0P1|ψ〉+ 1
2
〈ψ|P1P0|ψ〉 − 〈ψ|P0P1P0|ψ〉
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣〈ψ|P1P0P1|ψ〉 − 12 〈ψ|P0P1|ψ〉 − 12 〈ψ|P1P0|ψ〉
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣12 〈ψ|P0P1|ψ〉+ 12 〈ψ|P1P0|ψ〉 − 〈ψ|P0P1P0|ψ〉
∣∣∣∣ ,
where we have added a zero in the second equality and used the triangle inequality. In particular we obtain
the inequality
∣∣‖P0P1|ψ〉‖22 − ‖P1P0|ψ〉‖22∣∣ ≤ 2 max( ∣∣∣∣〈ψ|P1P0P1|ψ〉 − 12 〈ψ|P0P1|ψ〉 − 12 〈ψ|P1P0|ψ〉
∣∣∣∣ ,∣∣∣∣〈ψ|P0P1P0|ψ〉 − 12 〈ψ|P0P1|ψ〉 − 12 〈ψ|P1P0|ψ〉
∣∣∣∣ ) (10)
Putting Equations (8), (9) as well as its counterpart with 0 and 1 interchanged, and (10) together we arrive
at the conclusion that either ∣∣‖P1U0|ψ〉‖22 − ‖P1|ψ〉‖22∣∣ > δ, (11)
or this equation holds with 0 and 1 interchanged. Assume WLOG that Equation 11 holds. Consider the
adversary A that applies a Stinespring dilation of the verification algorithm, performs the unitary U0 and
then undoes the verification. This adversary produces a valid signed state by linearity. Indeed, let (pk, sk) be
a given key pair, and Vsk and Wpk be Stinespring dilation unitaries of the signing and verification algorithms,
respectively. Here and in the following a Stinespring dilation unitary of a quantum channel ΛR1→R2 from a
k-qubit register R1 to an `-qubit register R2 is a unitary U
Λ
R1E1→R2E2 such that
Λ(XR1) = TrE2
[
UΛR1E1→R2E2 (XR1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|E1)
(
UΛR1E1→R2E2
)†]
.
Let furthermore P˜0 = W
†
pkP0Wpk. By the correctness of the QS for M0, we have that∣∣‖P˜0V |φ〉‖22 − ‖P0|φ〉‖22∣∣ ≤ negl(n),
for all |φ〉, so in particular ∣∣‖P˜0V P0|ψ〉‖2 − ‖V P0|ψ〉‖2∣∣ ≤ negl(n),
which implies ‖P˜0V P0|ψ〉−V P0|ψ〉‖2 ≤ negl(n) and similarly ‖P˜0V (1−P0)|ψ〉‖2 ≤ negl(n). Together, these
inequalities yield
‖P˜0V |ψ〉 − V P0|ψ〉‖2 ≤ negl(n)
and therefore
‖U˜0V |ψ〉 − V U0|ψ〉‖2 ≤ negl(n), (12)
where U˜0 = W
†
pkU0Wpk. This shows that the attack U0 produces a valid ciphertext. Because of correctness
of the QS for M1 we have that ∣∣‖P1WV U0|ψ〉‖22 − ‖P1U0|ψ〉‖22∣∣ ≤ negl(n). (13)
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Equation 12 implies that verification only rejects with negligible probability when applied to U˜0V |ψ〉. The
ε-one-time security therefore implies that∣∣‖P1WU˜0V |ψ〉‖22 − ‖P1|ψ〉‖22∣∣ ≤ ε.
Combined with Equation 12 we therefore get∣∣‖P1WV U0|ψ〉‖22 − ‖P1|ψ〉‖22∣∣ ≤ ε+ negl(n)
and hence, using Equation 13, ∣∣‖P1U0|ψ〉‖22 − ‖P1|ψ〉‖22∣∣ ≤ ε+ negl(n).
Via Equation 11, this is a contradiction to assumption (7) as long as δ ≥ ε + negl(n), which finishes the
proof.
uunionsq
Note that for logarithmic-size message space, the conclusion of Theorem 3 is equivalent to an upper bound on
the commutator of the projectors forming the measurements Mi, as then all states are efficiently preparable.
Theorem 3 shows that simultaneously signing different properties of a quantum state is only possible if
these properties are essentially classical, implying that the best possible security can be achieved by just
measuring the Mi sequentially while at most incurring an error equal to the soundness parameter ε plus
a negligible function and signing the outcome classically. This classical-message protocol, would, however,
destroy any quantum properties of the plaintext state – even if no attack occurs. The following complementary
impossibility result indicates that part of this loss of quantum information is unavoidable: If we require full
correctness for a QS in the sense that the composition of Signsk and Vervk yields the identity channel on the
plaintext space, no security can be achieved.
Theorem 4. Let Π = (KeyGen,Sign,Ver) be a correct QS, and let M be a non-trivial two-outcome measure-
ment. Then Π is at most (1− negl(n))-one-time {M}-secure.
Proof. We use a similar idea as in the proof of Theorem 3. Just assuming correctness we can construct an
attack that begins by applying a Stinespring dilation of the verification algorithm. Subsequently we apply a
unitary that changes |ψ0〉 to |ψ1〉, where the |ψi〉 are efficiently prepareable states such that measuring M
on |ψi〉 returns result i with certainty. Finally, the attack undoes the Stinespring dilation of the verification.
The result is a valid signed state for |ψ1〉 when the attack is applied to a signed state for |ψ0〉.
The details are as follows. First note that Lemma 1 does not use the fact that the public key is public,
or that the secret key is secret, it only uses the correctness of the scheme. Therefore we can apply it to the
present QS as well to conclude that the quantum channel implemented by the verification algorithm fulfills
the equation ∥∥∥Signsk − Vk ((·)⊗ (σk)T )V †k ∥∥∥ ≤ negl(n) (14)∥∥∥Vervk(VkPσkT V †k (·)VkPσkT V †k )− TrT [PσkT (V †k (·)Vk)PσkT ]∥∥∥ ≤ negl(n), (15)
where k = vk, sk.6 In particular, Equation 15 implies that there exists a Stinespring dilation unitary WVervk
of Vervk such that ∥∥∥WVervkVkPσkT V †k (·)VkPσkT V †k (WVervk)− PσkT V †k (·)VkPσkT ∥∥∥ ≤ negl(n). (16)
Let WˆVervkCE1→ME2 be an efficiently implementable Stinespring dilation unitary of Vervk. We consider the fol-
lowing attack. Let |ψi〉M , i = 0, 1 be efficiently prepareable pure states such that M returns i with certainty
6 note that the unitary Vk is not necessarily efficiently implementable, i.e. it does not make sense to say it “only
depends on the verification key”. The same holds for the state σk.
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when applied to |ψi〉〈ψi|M , and let Ui be preparation unitaries for |ψi〉M , i.e. |ψi〉M = Ui|0〉M . The attack
map is now given by
A(X) = TrE1
[
UAXU
†
A
]
UA =
(
WˆVervk
)†
U1U
†
0Wˆ
Vervk .
Let us define P := VkP
σk
T V
†
k . According to Equation 16, we have∥∥∥PA (P (·)P )P − PU˜A (P (·)P ) U˜†AP∥∥∥ ≤ negl(n) (17)
U˜A = VkU1U
†
0V
†
k
When applying this attack to a ciphertext for |ψ0〉〈ψ0|M we calculate, using the symbol ≈ for equality up
to negligible difference in trace norm,
PA (PSignsk (|ψ0〉〈ψ0|M )P )P
≈ PU˜A (PSignsk (|ψ0〉〈ψ0|M )P ) U˜†AP
≈ PU˜AVk (|ψ0〉〈ψ0|M ⊗ (σk)T )V †k U˜†AP
= PVk
((
U1U
†
0 |ψ0〉〈ψ0|MU0U†1
)
⊗ (σk)T
)
V †k P
= Vk (|ψ1〉〈ψ1|M ⊗ (σk)T )V †k
≈ Signsk (|ψ1〉〈ψ1|M ) .
Here we have used Equation 17 in the second line, and Equation 14 in the third and last lines. In particular,
the calculation above implies that
PA (PSignsk (|ψ0〉〈ψ0|M )P )P
≈ A (Signsk (|ψ0〉〈ψ0|M )) .
We have thus, up to negligible difference, transformed a signature of |ψ0〉 into a signature of |ψ1〉 and therefore
have changed the outcome of M from 0 to 1 up to negligible probability. uunionsq
Some variants. Here we briefly discuss why some a-priori plausible ways to circumvent the above impos-
sibility results cannot work.
First, one might think of circumventing our impossibility result by defining a weak form of signatures
where the receiver can choose to either recover the original message or check the authenticity (but not
both.) Such “weak quantum signatures” may be enough for interesting applications. However, any useful
formulation of weak signatures is likely to imply strong signatures, via quantum error correction: first encode
the message, then weak-sign the qubits; during verification, check a random subset of the qubits (at most
half the code distance) and then use decoding to recover the message.
Second, one might try quantum keys. In [11], Gottesman and Chuang investigate the possibility of using
quantum keys to achieve information-theoretically secure digital signatures for classical data. In their model,
the public key is a quantum state, a copy of which can be requested by anybody, including the adversary.
A signature scheme like that for quantum data must fail, by the same arguments as in the proofs above: by
correctness, an attack using the reflection corresponding to one of the signed measurements will implement
the desired attack and leave the copy of the public key undisturbed. This implies impossibility even in a
weaker model where the adversary has to hand back the public key.
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4 Quantum Signcryption: Basic Ideas
As we saw in the previous section, signing states for public verification is impossible. We thus must resort to
using secret verification. This might seem to imply that we have to use secret-key authentication schemes,
which come with a dramatic cost: all pairs of parties wishing to communicate must share a key secret to that
pair. As it turns out, there is a far better option: signcryption. It is natural to define a notion of quantum
signcryption (analogous to classical signcryption [17,5]), which is a scheme for simultaneously signing and
encrypting a quantum state (for a particular recipient.)
4.1 Definition, Some Basic Facts, And A Construction.
The basic notion. Consider m parties who require pairwise authenticated and encrypted communication.
This can be solved using symmetric-key authenticated encryption, but at a cost of a quadratic number of
key-exchange executions. Moreover, each party would need to store m keys, and adding any new parties
would require another round of m key-exchange executions and an additional stored key for all parties.
With signcryption, the aim is to achieve the same goal but with drastically reduced resource requirements.
Each party needs only to run key generation privately, publish their public key, and keep their single private
key. Sending a message is now a matter of “signcrypting” with the sender’s private key (“sign”) and the
receiver’s public key (“encrypt.”) Receiving a message requires the opposite “verified-decrypting” with the
sender’s public key (“verify”) and the receiver’s private key (“decrypt.”) Note that adding new parties
becomes trivial.
We define signcryption for quantum states as follows.
Definition 8. A quantum signcryption scheme (or QSC) is a triple of QPT algorithms:
1. (key generation) KeyGen(1n) : output (sdk, vek)← KSD ×KVE
2. (signcrypt) SigEnc : KSD ×KVE ×D(HM )→ D(HC)
3. (verified decrypt) VerDec : KVE ×KSD ×D(HC)→ D(HM ⊕ |⊥〉〈⊥|)
such that
‖VerDecvekS ,sdkR ◦ SigEncsdkS ,vekR − 1M ⊕ 0⊥‖ ≤ negl(n) (18)
for all (sdkS , vekS), (sdkR, vekR)← KeyGen(1n).
The key spaces KSD and KVE are classical and of size poly(n), while the registers C and M are quan-
tum registers consisting of at most poly(n) qubits. Note that we have adopted the convention that, in the
subscripts of SigEnc and VerDec, the sender key always goes first. We will sometimes write SigEncS,R and
VerDecS,R to simplify this notation. As usual, we assume w.l.o.g. that sdk also includes vek, and vek also
includes n.
A QSC is used to transmit messages as follows. First, a sender S selects a message (placing it in register
M) and a receiver R. Then S applies SigEncsdkS ,vekR to M , using their secret key sdkS and the receiver’s
public key vekR. The resulting register C is sent to R, who applies VerDecvekS ,sdkR to C, using their secret key
sdkR and the sender’s public key vekS . Correctness (i.e., (18)) requires that the overall channel implemented
by this honest process should be 1M along with an “accept” output (indicated by “⊕0⊥”.)
Signatures and encryption from signcryption. Any quantum signcryption scheme trivially yields a
quantum signature scheme (Definition 5), as follows.
Proposition 1. Let Π = (KeyGen,SigEnc,VerDec) be a signcryption scheme (QSC.) Then the following is
a signature scheme (QS.)
• KeyGen′(1n): (sdkS , vekS) ← KeyGen(1n) and (sdkR, vekR) ← KeyGen(1n); output signing key sk :=
(sdkS , vekR) and verification key vk := (vekS , sdkR).
• Sign′sk := SigEncsk and Ver′vk := VerDecvk.
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As we will later show, this proposition and the impossibility results of Section 3 together imply that cer-
tain security conditions which are achievable by classical signcryption cannot be fulfilled when signcrypting
quantum states.
Any QSC also trivially yields a public-key quantum encryption scheme (Definition 4) – simply by swapping
the role of the public and secret keys above.
Proposition 2. Let Π = (KeyGen,SigEnc,VerDec) be a signcryption scheme (QSC.) Then the following is
a public-key encryption scheme (PKQE.)
• KeyGen′(1n): (sdkS , vekS) ← KeyGen(1n) and (sdkR, vekR) ← KeyGen(1n); output secret key dk :=
(vekS , sdkR) and public key ek := (sdkS , vekR).
• Enc′ek := SigEncek and Dec′dk := VerDecdk.
A basic construction. We now define a generic “hybrid” construction of quantum signcryption. We will
use a classical signcryption scheme to signcrypt a random key, and then use that key to encrypt the quantum
state with a (usually one-time secure) symmetric-key quantum encryption scheme.
Construction 1. Let ΠSC be a classical signcryption scheme, and ΠSKQE a symmetric-key quantum en-
cryption scheme. Define a quantum signcryption scheme ΠHybQSC[Π
SC, ΠSKQE] = (KeyGen,SigEnc,VerDec) as
follows:
1. KeyGen(1n) : output (sdk, vek)← KeyGenSC(1n);
2. SigEncS,R : on input %M , generate k ← KeyGenSKQE(1n) and output
(SigEncSCS,R(k),Enc
SKQE
k (%));
3. VerDecS,R : on input (c, σC), set k = VerDec
SC
S,R(c); if k = ⊥, output ⊥ and otherwise output DecSKQEk (σ).
We denote the analogous construction of public- (resp., symmetric-) key quantum encryption by ΠHybPKQE
(resp., ΠHybSKQE). A special case of this hybrid construction was proposed by Barnum et al. [6] (Section 5.1), but
without any security definitions or proofs. We will later formally examine the security of this construction
in various settings, and for various choices of ΠSC and ΠSKQE.
4.2 One-Time Signcryption Security
We now consider the simplest nontrivial setting of quantum signcryption: a single sender S needs to send a
single signcrypted state to a single receiver R. Our goal here is to describe the most basic setting of interest,
with definitions and security notions that require only minimal familiarity with previous work on quantum
encryption and authentication. We will build up to the full setting in Section 5.
Outsider security. In the first, so-called “outsider security” setting, an untrusted third-party adversary A
attacks the channel between S and R. We assume that A can convince S to signcrypt any message, leaving
A free to manipulate the resulting signcryption before convincing R to unsigncrypt.
Experiment 3. Let Π = (KeyGen,SigEnc,VerDec) be a quantum signcryption scheme. An outsider attack
(in the one-time, two-user setting) by a QPT A proceeds as follows.
1. (Setup.) Generate (sdkS , vekS) ← KeyGen(1n) and (sdkS , vekS) ← KeyGen(1n). Give vekS and vekR to
A.
2. (Signcrypt.) A prepares a state %MB and SigEncS,R is applied to register M , yielding registers C and B.
3. (Attack, unsigncrypt.) A applies a channel ΛCB→CB (possibly depending on vekS , vekR), and VerDecS,R
is applied to register C.
We refer to A as an outside attacker, and define the effective attack map
Λ˜
(A,S,R)
MB→MB := VerDecS,R ◦ Λ ◦ SigEncS,R .
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 SigEnc VerDec
Fig. 1. A one-time outsider attack.
Our security definition will be based on the standard DNS security notion for quantum authentica-
tion [10,8], adapted to the particulars of our setting. Specifically, we will require that any (efficient) outside
attack amounts to a choice between implementing the “identity map” or the “discard map” on the plaintext
space. The former results in a reject.
Definition 9. A QSC Π is (one-time, two-user) outsider-secure if, for every QPT outside attacker A,
there exists a QPT simulator S which implements a map ΦMB→MB of the form
Φ : σMB 7−→ ΦaccB→B(σMB) + |⊥〉〈⊥| ⊗ ΦrejB→B(σB)
which is indistinguishable from Λ˜(A,S,R), and where Φacc and Φrej act on B only.
A strengthening. Note that both SigEnc and VerDec receive, in addition to their input, a private parameter
(i.e., sdk) and a public parameter (i.e., vek.) It is thus reasonable to define a stronger notion of security,
where the adversary can set these parameters for the oracle calls occurring in the “Signcrypt” and “Attack,
unsigncrypt” phases of Experiment 3. Indeed, this models a very plausible real-world attack. Since our goal
here is to develop the one-time setting as a minimal first stepping stone, we will examine this stronger
security later, when we address the multi-user setting in Section 5.
Insider security. Note that an outside attacker knows all but two pieces of information: the private key
of S, and the private key of R. In “insider security,” we consider the case where one of these private keys is
known to the attacker (if both are known, security is impossible.)
Insider security of sender. First, consider the case of an adversary in possession of sdkR. The private in-
formation is now only sdkS , and the public information (i.e., the information accessible by the adversary)
is sdkR, vekR, vekS . This means the adversary can unsigncrypt, so we can’t expect S to maintain any se-
crecy. Can S expect unforgeability? If they could, then this would yield (as in Proposition 1) an unforgeable
quantum signature scheme with secret signing key (sdkS , vekR) and public verification key (vekS , sdkR).)
However, the impossibility results of Section 3 state that this induced signature scheme cannot satisfy even
the most minimal security requirements. It follows that quantum signcryption cannot fulfill any insider
security guarantees in this case.
Recall that non-repudiation is a property of classical digital signatures. It means simply that, due to the
unforgeability property, the recipient R of a document m signed by a sender S can present the document and
signature to a third party (e.g., the judge) as evidence thatm was indeed signed by S. If quantum signcryption
is used instead, the impossibility results of Section 3 tell us that R will be able to forge signcryptions; so,
this property is impossible to achieve quantumly.
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Insider security of receiver. It remains to consider insider security where the adversary has sdkS . The private
information is now only sdkR. By Proposition 2, Π is now a public-key quantum encryption scheme, with
secret decryption key (sdkR, vekS) and public encryption key (sdkS , vekR).
Definition 10. A QSC Π is (one-time, two-user) insider-secure if the public-key quantum encryption
scheme induced by making the sender key public (i.e., via Proposition 2) satisfies QIND-CPA.
As with outsider security, we will not (yet) concern ourselves with adversaries who can select the key pa-
rameters of the SigEnc and VerDec calls.
We remark that the above definitions of one-time security translate directly to the classical setting,
by using standard notions of classical unforgeability and secrecy (see, e.g., [12]) and plugging them into
Definition 9 and Definition 10.
Achieving one-time outsider and insider security. We now show that the hybrid scheme ΠHybQSC achieves
security in this setting, when equipped with appropriate component schemes.
Theorem 5. Select the following:
• A classical signcryption scheme ΠSC with one-time outsider and insider security (defined as above);
• A cDNS-secure SKQE scheme ΠSKQE (Definition 18).
Then ΠHybQSC[Π
SC, ΠSKQE] (Construction 1) is a quantum signcryption scheme which is one-time outsider-
secure and insider-secure.
Proof. We provide a brief sketch; for the full proof see Supplemental Section C.3. Insider security follows
from the QIND-CPA security of the hybrid PKQE construction (i.e. Theorem 6) and the fact that cDNS
implies QIND [6,4]. For outsider security, observe that if the attack map Λ modifies the classical part c of
the ciphertext, the decryption function will reject with overwhelming probability due to the unforgeability of
ΠSC. Assuming that Λ doesn’t change c, we can replace c by an encryption c′ of 0 by the IND-CPA security
of ΠSC, and swapping c and c′ back right before decryption. This modified experiment can be simulated
using the cDNS oracles: we (i.) apply ΛCB , then (ii.) discard register C
SC. ΠSKQE is cDNS secure, so for
every attack there exists a simulator that either does not attack or rejects. Applying this fact to the attack
described above, we obtain a simulator for ΠHybQSC as mandated by Definition 9 when the input state
%′MBCClK = %MB ⊗ SigEncsdkS ,vekR
(
k˜
)
⊗ (sdkS , vekS , sdkR, vekR)
with (sdki, veki)← KeyGenSC for i = S,R and k˜ ← KeyGenSKQE is supplied. uunionsq
To get an explicit instantiation, we can let ΠSC be a classical signcryption scheme constructed from
Lamport signatures and standard post-quantum IND-CPA public-key LWE encryption via “encrypt-then-
sign,” and let ΠSKQE to be the scheme Enck : % 7→ Ck (%⊗ |0n〉〈0n|)C†k where {Ck}k is the Clifford group.
5 Quantum Signcryption: Full Security
We now describe in detail how to “upgrade” from the (one-time, two-user) setting of the previous section,
to the full setting. This will involve three steps. First, in Section 5.1 we will describe how to upgrade to
many-time security. The adversary will now have oracle access to SigEncS,R and VerDecS,R, but secrecy
and authenticity must still be preserved. The usual classical security games for these notions do not make
sense with quantum data. A recent approach of [3] shows how to get around these issues for symmetric-key
encryption; we will extend this approach to our setting. Second, in Section 5.2 we will upgrade to multiple
users. This means keeping track of “IDs” for each user, and adding some constraints, e.g., to prevent identity
fraud. Here we will give a generic transformation (following [5]) which turns any two-user secure QSC into a
multi-user secure QSC simply by attaching IDs to the plaintext before signcrypting. Finally, in Section 5.3
we will describe how to upgrade all of the above to ensure ciphertext authenticity.
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5.1 Upgrading To The Many-Time Setting
We begin by upgrading from the one-time setting to the many-time setting, while keeping the number of
users at two, i.e., one sender S and one receiver R.
Outsider security. As in the one-time setting, the attack here is launched by a third-party adversary A
against a sender-receiver pair (S,R). In addition to knowing the public information vekS , vekR, A will now
also be able to observe some of the transmissions from S to R. It is also reasonable to expect that A will
have some knowledge about (or even control over) what is being transmitted. As usual, we model this by
being as generous as possible to the adversary; specifically, we give A oracle access to both SigEncS,R and
VerDecS,R. As it turns out, we will be able to use the approach of [3] to define security, thus avoiding the
usual issues with quantum no-cloning and measurement. As signcryption provides secrecy, authenticity and
integrity, it can be seen as a kind of public-key analogue of authenticated encryption. Due to the similar
security goals, we use a plaintext-based public-key version of the real vs. ideal approach developed in [3] for
the definition of quantum authenticated encryption.
Let Π = (KeyGen,SigEnc,VerDec) be a quantum signcryption scheme with message register M and
signcryption register C. In addition, select a security parameter n and an oracle QPT adversary A. Let |φ+〉
denote some choice of maximally entangled state, and Π+ the projector |φ+〉〈φ+| onto that state.
Experiment 4. The real outsider experiment Out-Real(Π,A, n):
1: (sdkS , vekS)← KeyGen(1n) and (sdkR, vekR)← KeyGen(1n);
2: output ASigEncS,R,VerDecS,R(1n).
Experiment 5. The ideal outsider experiment Out-Ideal(Π,A, n):
1: (sdkS , vekS)← KeyGen(1n) and (sdkR, vekR)← KeyGen(1n);
2: define channel EM→C :
(1) prepare |φ+〉M ′M ′′ , store (M ′′,M) in a set M;
(2) apply SigEncS,R to M
′; return result.
3: define channel DC→M :
(1) apply VerDecS,R to C, place results in M
′;
(2) for each (M ′′,M) ∈M do:
(3) apply {Π+,1−Π+} to M ′M ′′;
(4) if outcome is 0: return M ;
(5) end for
(6) return |⊥〉〈⊥|;
4: output AE,D(1n).
Definition 11. A quantum signcryption scheme Π is (many-time, two-user) outsider secure if for all
QPT adversaries A,
|Pr [Out-Real(Π,A, n)→ real]− Pr [Out-Ideal(Π,A, n)→ real]| ≤ negl(n).
Insider Security. As before, the remaining conditions to consider amount to allowing the adversary access
to the private key of either S or R (but not both) which we can simply view as one of the two parties (S
or R) attacking the other. Also as before, the impossibility results for quantum signatures (Section 3) imply
that one cannot expect any security in the case where R is the adversary. It remains to consider the case
where S is the adversary, and ask if the secrecy of R can be preserved. Here we ask for the strongest notion
of secrecy, which is QIND-CCA2. This notion was recently defined in [3] in the symmetric-key case; we show
how to adapt it to the public-key case in Section B.1 (where we also define the corresponding cDNS-based
“weak” variant QIND-wCCA2).
Definition 12. A quantum signcryption scheme Π is insider-secure (many-time, two-user) if the public-
key quantum encryption scheme induced by making the sender key public (i.e., via Proposition 2) satisfies
QIND-CCA2.
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Security of the classical-quantum hybrid. We will show security for the hybrid quantum signcryption
scheme by leveraging results about the security of the hybrid approach in two other settings: public-key
chosen-ciphertext-secure encryption, and symmetric-key authenticated encryption. The public-key hybrid
scheme was first introduced in [7]. In Appendix B, we prove that this hybrid construction preserves security,
in the following sense.
Theorem 6. Let Π be a PKE, and Σ a SKQE. Then ΠHybPKQE[Π,Σ] is a public-key quantum encryption
scheme (PKQE). Moreover, we have:
1. If Π is IND-CPA and Σ is QIND, then ΠHybPKQE[Π,Σ] is QIND-CPA.
2. If Π is IND-CCA1 and Σ is QIND, then ΠHybPKQE[Π,Σ] is QIND-CCA1.
3. If Π is IND-CCA2 and Σ is cDNS, then ΠHybPKQE[Π,Σ] is QIND-wCCA2.
4. If Π is IND-CCA2 and Σ is cQCA, then ΠHybPKQE[Π,Σ] is QIND-CCA2.
In the symmetric-key case, we need authenticated encryption. Classically this is chosen-ciphertext secrecy
plus unforgeability of ciphertexts. Quantumly, we need the aforementioned notion of QAE (and in our case,
for ease of exposition in this work, also a cDNS-based weakened version, wQAE) defined in the real/ideal
approach as described in Appendix B.2. There we also show the following.
Theorem 7. Let Π be a classical symmetric-key authenticated encryption scheme, and let Σ be a cDNS-
(resp., cQCA-) secure symmetric-key quantum encryption scheme. Then ΠHybPKQE[Π,Σ] is a wQAE- (resp.,
QAE-) secure symmetric-key quantum encryption scheme.
Achieving Many-Time, Two-User Security. With the above generic results on the classical-quantum
hybrid in hand, we can now show security of the quantum signcryption hybrid. It turns out that the hybrid
scheme can achieve both outsider and insider (sender) security even in the many-time setting, provided
that the classical component is strengthened sufficiently. This is proven as Theorem 11 and Corollary 2 in
Appendix B.
Theorem 8. Select the following:
• A many-time, two-user outsider- and insider-secure signcryption ΠSC;
• and a cDNS-secure symmetric-key quantum encryption ΠSKQE.
Then ΠHybQSC[Π
SC, ΠSKQE] (Construction 1) is a quantum signcryption scheme which is (many-time, two-user)
outsider-secure and insider-secure.
5.2 Upgrading To The Multi-User Setting
In the multi-user setting there are different users, each with unique “IDs.” We denote the ID of a party P
by IDP ∈ I. We assume that there is an efficient public lookup for the map IDP 7→ vekP (this is usually
achieved by a root of trust, PKI, or similar). In this setting we need to change the syntax of signcryption in
order to account for the adversary’s ability to spoof sender’s and/or receiver’s identitites. In order to protect
the scheme against these attacks we need to bind the users’ identities to the corresponding keys, and impose
extra correctness conditions based on the match between identities and keys. There are different ways to
achieve this; in this work, we opt for the simplified notation below. In particular, we assume that every user
P has a single keypair (it is possible to remove this restriction by adding a key index to the output of KeyGen
and managing the index together with the identities. This is straightforward but beyond the scope of this
work.)
Definition 13. A (multi-user) quantum signcryption scheme (or muQSC) is a triple of QPT algorithms:
• (key generation) KeyGen : (1n, IDP ∈ I) 7→ (sdkP , vekP ) ∈ KSD ×KVE
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• (signcrypt) SigEnc : KSD ×KVE ×D(HM )→ D(HC)
• (unsigncrypt) VerDec : KSD ×KVE ×D(HC)→ I2 ⊗D(HM ⊕ |⊥〉〈⊥|)
such that:
1. ‖VerDecsdkR,vekS ◦ SigEncsdkS ,vekR − {S,R} ⊗ (1M ⊕ 0⊥) ‖ ≤ negl(n)
2. For VerDecsdkR,vekS (X) = (S
′, R′, Y ), if Y 6= ⊥, then (R,S) = (R′, S′)
for all (sdkP , vekP ) ∈ suppKeyGen(1n, IDP ), and where we assume w.l.o.g. that sdkP also includes vekP ,
and vekP also includes 1
n and IDP , for every (sdkP , vekP )← KeyGen(1n, IDP ),∀ P ∈ I.
Note that the output of VerDecsdkR,vekS includes user identities for sender and receiver. Correctness
demands that such identities are the ones corresponding to the keys used during a “correct” usage of SigEnc.
In theory nothing forbids a malicious adversary to modify a ciphertext in such a way that the resulting
identities output by VerDec are different. In this sense, an “identity fraud attack” for signcryption in the
multi-user setting results in a forgery attack.
Outsider security. The scenario here is similar to outsider security for the two-user setting: an external
adversary A mounts an attack against a sender/receiver pair (S,R). However, there are two fundamental
differences:
• there are many users in I, and hence many possible (S,R) pairs; and
• beyond the “usual” attack scenarios covered by the two-user case, A might be able to attack the sign-
cryption scheme by performing identity fraud (i.e., spoofing the identity of the sender or the receiver of
a signcrypted message).
Dealing with the latter is easy: as previously discussed in Definition 13, in order to mount an identity
fraud attack A has to modify the identities output by the VerDec algorithm. This means that such attacks
are actually a special case of message forgeries, which are already covered by the real vs. ideal approach in
the outsider security scenario of Section 5.1.
The other issue is more subtle. There might be insecure schemes which produce weaker keys for certain
user IDs, and the adversary might exploit this weakness. Or there might be schemes where the compromise
of a certain number of users (and hence knoweldge of their secret keys) also compromises the security of
other users. In order to deal with all these scenarios, we will adopt a very conservative approach:
1. the adversary is given the possibility of choosing S and R among I; and
2. the adversary receives the secret keys of all the other users.
We define the modified experiments M-Out-Real and M-Out-Ideal accordingly (see Supplemental Section D,
and security is given as usual in terms of indistinguishability of the two.
Definition 14. A multi-user quantum signcryption scheme Π is outsider secure if for all QPT A,
|Pr [M-Out-Real(Π,A, n)→ real]− Pr [M-Out-Ideal(Π,A, n)→ real]| ≤ negl(n).
Insider security. In addition to picking a sender and receiver of his choice, the adversary is now allowed
to access the private key of either of the two (but not both). Also as before, given the impossibility results
for quantum signatures (Section 3), it makes sense to consider the case where S is the adversary, and ask
if the secrecy of R can be preserved. Again, we ask for the strongest notion of secrecy. However, given the
multi-user setting, we must now consider a multi-user version of QIND-CCA2, where the adversary gets to
pick the target R to attack, and receives all other user’s secret keys. We omit the details here, as the resulting
definition follows a similar approach as in the outsider security case.
Definition 15. A multi-user quantum signcryption scheme Π is insider-secure if the public-key quantum
encryption scheme induced by making the sender key public (i.e., via Proposition 2) satisfies (the multi-user
version of) QIND-CCA2.
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Achieving Many-Time, Multi-User Security. The multi-user definitions can then be fulfilled in a way
analogous to the classical case. Here, An, Dodis and Rabin [5] describe a simple generic transformation from
a two-user secure scheme to a multi-user secure scheme, which proceeds as follows. Whenever signcrypting
any plaintext, we first attach to the plaintext the IDs of both the sender and the intended receiver. When
applying verified decryption, we check whether the IDs attached to the plaintext are correct. If so, we
output the plaintext, otherwise reject. Arguing multi-user security of this transformation then reduces in a
straightforward way to two-user security, along the same line of argument as is done in [5].
5.3 Upgrading To Ciphertext Authentication
As discussed above, the security notions we have developed for signcryption provide for plaintext security.
For instance, in the outsider security case, this means that the adversary cannot perform any attack which
modifies the underlying plaintext. The advantage of this approach is that the security games and definitions
are rather simple to state and describe, and intuitive. However, this leaves open the possibility of adversaries
that modify ciphertexts without being noticed. As it turns out, we can address this case as well, roughly
following the route followed by [3] in the private-key encryption setting. Here we only briefly describe the
modifications, as they are essentially identical to those in [3].
First, we observe that the characterization lemma (Lemma 1) shows that all quantum encryption schemes
follow a simple “attach auxiliary state, then apply keyed isometry Vk” form. This form is also efficient in all
schemes we are aware of (we state this formally as Condition 1), but may in principle be inefficient.
Next, with this characterization in hand, we can replace the “trap setting” step of each relevant security
game (e.g., Step 1 in the Out-Ideal experiment) as follows. We still encrypt half of a maximally-entangled
state φ+ and store the input and half of φ+. In addition, we now also store the classical randomness used to
sample the aforementioned auxiliary state (prior to applying Vk.)
We then correspondingly adjust the second “cheat detection” step of each relevant security game (e.g.,
Step 2 in the Out-Ideal experiment), as follows. Given a ciphertext, we first undo the isometry V †k . We
then check if the auxiliary state agrees with the stored randomness. If it does, we additionally perform the
entanglement check as before. If both checks say “yes,” we supply the stored state. Otherwise we output
⊥. (In the insider-security case, it’s slightly different: “yes” now means that the adversary is attempting to
decrypt the challenge, so we simply terminate and output “cheat.”)
This transformation yields enhanced cheat-detection games for both outsider-security (analogous to QAE)
and insider-security (analogous to QIND-CCA2.) Security is then still defined in terms of the advantage of
adversaries at distinguishing the test game from the corresponding cheat-detection game for outsider security,
and the winning advantage in the test game over the cheat-detection game for insider security, respectively.
Provided that the relevant construction now uses QCA [3] instead of cDNS quantum authentication as a
building block, the security proofs carry over essentially unchanged.
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A Characterization Of Quantum Encryption
In this section, we will prove Lemma 1 which requires the following
Theorem 9 (Theorem I in [13]). Let T
(i)
A→A, i = 1, 2 be quantum channels with the same input and output
systems, and let U
(i)
A→AE be Stinespring dilation isometries of T
(i). then there exists a unitary VE→E such
that
‖V U (1) − U (2)‖2∞ ≤ ‖T (1) − T (2)‖ ≤ 2‖V U (1) − U (2)‖∞.
Proof. (of Lemma 1.) To simplify notation, we fix a key pair k and omit all key subscripts. We indicate
input and output systems for channels, and support systems for operators, using subscripts as necessary. Let
(U)M→CE , and (W )C→MF , be Stinespring dilation isometries of Enc, and Dec, respectively, i.e.,
Enc(X) = TrEUXU
† and Dec(Y ) = TrFWYW †.
Now, ε-approximate correctness together with Theorem 9 implies that there exists a pure state |φ〉EF such
that
‖(W )C→MF (U)M→CE − 1M ⊗ |φ〉EF ‖∞ ≤
√
ε.
Let WˆCR→MF be a unitary such that WˆCR→MF |0〉R = WC→MF . Such a unitary exists without loss of
generality (If C does not divide MF , we can jus pick a bigger F ). By the unitary invariance of the operator
norm, we get ∥∥∥(U)M→CE ⊗ |0〉R − (Wˆ †)
MF→CR
|φ〉EF
∥∥∥
∞
≤ √ε.
Therefore we get ∥∥∥(U)M→CE − 〈0|R (Wˆ †)
MF→CR
|φ〉EF
∥∥∥
∞
≤ √ε. (19)
by the submultiplicativity of the operator norm. Let
〈0|R
(
Wˆ †
)
MF→CR
|φ〉EF = U (1)M→CEDMU (2)M
be the singular value decomposition of the second matrix. Equation 19 implies ‖1M −DM‖∞ ≤
√
ε, and
hence ∥∥∥∥〈0|R (Wˆ †)
MF→CR
|φ〉EF − 〈0|R
(
Wˆ †
(
U (2)
)†
D−1U (2)
)
MF→CR
|φ〉EF
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤
∥∥∥U (1)M→CEDMU (2)M − U (1)M→CEU (2)M ∥∥∥∞ ≤ √ε (20)
and (
V˜
)
M→CE
= 〈0|R
(
Wˆ †
(
U (2)
)†
D−1U (2)
)
MF→CR
|φ〉EF
is an isometry. Combining Equations (19) and (20), we arrive at∥∥∥(U)M→CE − (V˜ )
M→CE
∥∥∥
∞
≤ 2√ε.
Defining ˜Enc(X) = TrE V˜ XV˜
†, we conclude that∥∥∥Enc− ˜Enc∥∥∥

≤max
%MS
∥∥∥U%U† − V˜ %V˜ †∥∥∥

≤ 4√ε,
where the first inequality is due to the definition of the diamond norm and the fact that the trace norm is
non-increasing under partial trace, and the second inequality is a double application of Ho¨lder’s inequality.
˜Enc has the form we want, although this fact is still quite hidden. To show it, we define
(A)MF→C = 〈0|R
(
Wˆ †
(
U (2)
)†
D−1U (2)
)
MF→CR
,
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so that we can write
˜Enc(X) = (A)MF→C (XM ⊗ (φ)F )
(
A†
)
C→MF .
A is not, in general, an isometry. ˜Enc is, however, trace preserving, implying A†A = 1M ⊗ κF such that
Tr(κFφF ) = 1. Setting T = F , σT =
√
κFφF
√
κF and letting V be a completion of Aκ
−1/2 to a unitary
shows now that ˜Enc has the desired form. For notational convenience, define δ = ε+ 4
√
ε.
To show the form of the decryption map, observe that, again by Theorem 9, there exists a possibly
different Stinespring dilation isometry W ′C→CT for Dec and a quantum state |φ′k〉ET such that
‖W ′C→CTVMT→C |φ〉TE − 1M ⊗ |φ′〉ET ‖∞ ≤
√
δ
In particular, there is a unitary UT such that ‖UT |φ〉TE − |φ′〉TE‖2 ≤
√
δ, so
‖W ′C→CTV ′MT→C |φ′〉TE − 1M ⊗ |φ′〉TE‖∞ ≤ 2
√
δ, (21)
with V ′ = V U†. Let |φ′〉TE =
∑
i
√
q
i
|γi〉T ⊗|ηi〉E be the Schmidt decomposition of |φ′〉. Equation 21 implies
that
qi ‖W ′C→CTV ′MT→C |γi〉T − 1M ⊗ |γi〉T ‖∞ ≤ 2
√
δ. (22)
Let PT =
∑
i:qi≥(4δ)
1
6
|γi〉〈γi|. Then we get∥∥W ′C→CTV ′MT→CPT (V ′†)C→MT − PT (V ′†)C→MT∥∥∞
≤
∑
i:qi≥(4δ)
1
6
∥∥W ′C→CTV ′MT→C |γi〉〈γi|T (V ′†)C→MT − 1M ⊗ |γi〉〈γi|T (V ′†)C→MT∥∥∞
≤(4δ) 16 ,
where we have used Equation 22 and the fact that rkP ≤ 1
(4δ)
1
6
. Using that W ′ is a Stinespring dilation
isometry for Dec shows the second claimed inequality. uunionsq
By viewing σsk in its eigenbasis, we see that the characterization can be enhanced so it only uses classical
randomness.
Corollary 1. Let Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) be a PKQE. Then for every keypair k := (ek, dk), there exists
a probability distribution pk : {0, 1}t → [0, 1] and a family of quantum states |ψ(k,r)〉T such that Enck is
equivalent to the following algorithm: (i.) sample r ∈ {0, 1}t according to pk; (ii.) apply the map XM 7→
Vk
(
XM ⊗ |ψ(k,r)〉〈ψ(k,r)|T
)
V †k . Here Vk and T are as in Lemma 1, and t is the number of qubits in T .
Importantly, even if Enck is a polynomial-time algorithm, the functionally-equivalent algorithm provided
by Corollary 1 may not be. We thus define the following.
Condition 1. Let Π be a PKQE, and let pk, |ψ(k,r)〉 and Vk be as in Corollary 1. We say Π satisfies
Condition 1 if there exist QPTs for (i.) sampling from pk, (ii.) preparing |ψ(k,r)〉, and (iii.) implementing
Vk on inputs of the form %⊗ |ψ(k,r)〉〈ψ(k,r)|, and this holds for all but a negligible fraction of k and r.
We stress that we are not aware of any known or trivially defined construction of PKQE where Condition 1
does not hold.
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B Security Proofs
We now give several new security proofs for quantum encryption, and a proof of many-time security for
hybrid quantum signcryption, i.e., Construction 1.
B.1 Strong Secrecy For Hybrid Public-Key Encryption
For PKQE schemes, the notions of QIND-CPA and QIND-CCA1 are defined in [2], where the adversary A =
(A1,A2) consists of two parts (pre-challenge and post-challenge), and is playing against a challenger C, which
is a fixed algorithm determined only by the security game and the scheme.
Theorem 10. Let ΠPKE be an IND-CPA (resp., IND-CCA1) PKE. Let further ΠSKQE be a QIND SKQE. Then
ΠHybPKQE[Π
PKE, ΠSKQE] is a QIND-CPA (resp., QIND-CCA1) PKQE.
Proof. We will prove the CPA case; the CCA1 case is essentially identical. For a contradiction, let A be a
QPT machine which wins the QIND-CPA game against ΠHybPKQE[Π
PKE, ΠSKQE] with probability 1/2 + δ where
δ is non-negligible in n. Let A1 and A2 be the pre-challenge and post-challenge algorithms of A. Define an
adversary A′ against ΠPKE as follows. The pre-challenge algorithm A′1 accepts ek, runs % ← A1(ek), and
outputs m ← KeyGenSKQE(1n). The post-challenge algorithm A′2, on input c, proceeds as follows: (i.) flip a
coin b′ $←−{0, 1}, (ii.) if b′ = 0, set t = A2(c,EncΠ
SKQE
m (%)); if b
′ = 1 set t = A2(c,EncΠ
SKQE
m (1/dM )); (iii.) if
t = b′ set bout = 0; otherwise set bout $←−{0, 1}, and (iv.)output bout.
Now consider A′ in the IND-CPA game, and let b be the challenge bit. If b = 0, then the execution of A
is exactly simulating the QIND-CPA game, and so Pr[bout = b] ≥ 1/2 + δ. If b = 1, then the encryption of %
is done with an independent key; by QIND, Pr[t = b′] = 1/2 which implies that Pr[bout = b] = 1/2. We thus
have that, overall, Pr[bout = b] ≥ 1/2 · (1/2 + δ) + 1/2 · 1/2 ≥ 1/2 + δ/2, meaning that A′ would break the
IND-CPA security of ΠPKE. uunionsq
In this section, we adopt techniques from [3] in order to define quantum CCA2 security for PKQE. Recall
that in the present work, for ease of exposition, we use integrity check techniques based on the simpler and
more familiar DNS notion of plaintext authentication instead of the more complicated notion of QCA from
[3]. This, in particular, has the advantage that the analysis in this work applies to all quantum encryption
schemes (see [3] for details). On the other hand, this approach requires the repeated application of the
Gentle Measurement Lemma [16], and can therefore only be fulfilled by schemes with plaintext spaces of
large dimension, with a loss in the tightness of the resulting reductions. We discuss in Section 5.3 how to lift
our results to the QCA-based setting.
We begin by defining a cDNS-style version of QIND-CCA2, which we call weak CCA2 (QIND-wCCA2).
Here, intuitively, the decryption oracle refuses to decrypt any ciphertext that decrypts to the challenge
plaintext. While not providing the best possible quantum counterpart to IND-CCA2, this notion fits the
simplified framework of this article, and the upgrade to QIND-CCA2 is straightforward.
As in the case of QIND-CCA2, we define QIND-wCCA2 in terms of the advantage gap of adversaries
between two games. The first game is the same as QCCA2-Test from [3] for the symmetric-key case, except
that the Enc oracle is replaced by the public key; in this game there are no restrictions on the use of Decdk
by A2. In the cheat-detection game QwCCA2-Fake, instead, the adversary is declared to cheat whenever he
replays the challenge state (and declared to cheat anyway with probability 1/2 otherwise). The only difference
in respect to QCCA2-Fake from [3] (beyond the replacement of the Enc oracle with the public key), is that
the challenge-replay test is done cDNS-style (detecting plaintext replay) instead of cQCA-style (detecting
ciphertext replay).
Experiment 6. The QCCA2-Test(Π,A, n) experiment:
1: C runs (dk, ek)← KeyGen(1n) and flips a coin b $←−{0, 1};
2: A1 receives ek and oracle access to Decdk;
3: A1 prepares a side register S, and sends to C a challenge register M ;
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4: C puts into C either Encek(M) (if b = 0) or Encek(τM ) (if b = 1);
5: A2 receives registers C and S and oracle access to Decdk;
6: A2 outputs a bit b′. If b′ = b, output win; otherwise output rej.
Experiment 7. The QwCCA2-Fake(Π,A, n) experiment:
1: C runs (dk, ek)← KeyGen(1n);
2: A1 receives ek and oracle access to Decdk;
3: A1 prepares a side register S, and sends to C a challenge register M ;
4: C discards M , prepares |φ+〉M ′M ′′ , and stores M ′′; then C encrypts M ′ (using ek) and puts the resulting
ciphertext into C ′;
5: A2 receives registers C ′ and S and oracle access to Ddk, where Ddk is defined as follows. On input a
register C:
(1) C applies Decdk to C, places result in M ;
(2) C applies {Π+,1−Π+} to MM ′′;
(3) if the outcome is 1 then: abort and output cheat; else return M ;
6: C draws a bit b at random. If b = 1, output cheat; if b = 0 output rej.
As usual, we define QIND-wCCA2 in terms of the advantage gap of adversaries between the two games.
Definition 16. A PKQE Π is QIND-wCCA2 if, for all QPT adversaries A,
Pr[QCCA2-Test(Π,A, n)→ win]− Pr[QwCCA2-Fake(Π,A, n)→ cheat] ≤ negl(n) .
Clearly, because an adversary for QIND-wCCA2 is also an adversary for QIND-CCA1 with additional power
and additional constraints on the scheme itself, we see that QIND-wCCA2 implies QIND-CCA1 and hence
also QIND-CPA. Moreover, one can show that the hybrid construction behaves as expected:
Theorem 11. Let ΠPKE be an IND-CCA2 PKE scheme, and let ΠSKQE be a cDNS-secure SKQE scheme.
Then ΠHybPKQE[Π
PKE, ΠSKQE] is a QIND-wCCA2-secure PKQE scheme.
Proof (Sketch). (For details, see Supplemental Section C.4.) We follow the same strategy as the proof of
QIND-CPA security, i.e., Theorem 10. Specifically, given an adversary A which can distinguish the “test”
and “fake” games, we will build an adversary A′ against the CCA2-secure classical public-key scheme. This
adversary proceeds as follows:
(1.) pass the input (1n and the public key ek) to start A;
(2.) simulate each decryption query in the obvious way: query the PKE Dec oracle on the classical part of
the input, then decrypt the quantum part using the resultant plaintext as the SKQE key.
(3.) When A outputs the challenge %, send a fresh one-time key k as our IND-CCA2 challenge, receive the
challenge PKE ciphertext c back.
(4.) Now flip a coin b to decide whether, for the remainder of the game, we will simulate the “test” game (b =
0) or the “fake” game (b = 1) with A. In the case “test”, we will use the challenge ciphertext (c,EncQCAk (%)).
It is clear that, in this case, we can faithfully simulate the rest of the game.
(5.) if A correctly guesses b, we output 0. If not, we output a fair coin.
We argue that A′ wins the PKE IND-CCA2 game with non-negligible advantage over random guessing.
First, if the PKE challenge bit is 0 (i.e., undisturbed challenge), then we are faithfully simulating A in either
the “test” or the “fake” games. We will thus gain precisely the advantage of A over random guessing, in
this case. It remains to check that, if the PKE challenge bit is 1 (i.e., discarded challenge), then A′ does no
worse than random guessing. This is done by reduction to cDNS security. Note that, in this case, the SKQE
encryption provided to A is performed with a key k which is independent of all other random variables in the
game (since c is an encryption of a random string, and not k.) If the adversary can nonetheless distinguish
the “test” game from the “fake” game, then (by the definition of these games) this implies that he cannot
be simulated by an “ignore or discard” channel demanded by the cDNS security definition. uunionsq
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B.2 Plaintext QAE For Hybrid Private-Key Encryption
In this section we show that the hybrid construction for symmetric-key schemes, ΠHybSKQE, can be used to lift
the security of a SKQE scheme from cQCA to QAE, by combining it with a classical AE scheme. We will
show this for a weak, plaintext-based version of QAE starting from a cDNS SKQE scheme. The general result
follows from the discussion in Section 5.3.
We start from the QAE-Real and QAE-Ideal games defined in [3] for QAE, but in the latter game we
replace the cQCA-style quantum ciphertext replay check by a cDNS-style plaintext replay check. We call the
new gamewQAE-Ideal; a SKQE is now defined to be weak quantum authenticated encryption (wQAE) secure
if no QPT adversary can reliably distinguish the two.
Experiment 8. The experiment QAE-Real(Π,A, n):
1: k ← KeyGen(1n) ;
2: output AEnck,Deck(n).
Experiment 9. The experiment wQAE-Ideal(Π,A, n):
1: k ← KeyGen(1n) ;
2: define channel EM→C as follows:
(1) prepare |φ+〉M ′M ′′ , store (M ′′,M) in a set M;
(2) apply Enck to M
′; return result.
3: define channel DC→M as follows:
(1) apply Deck to C, place results in M
′;
(2) for each (M ′′,M) ∈M do:
(3) apply {Π+,1−Π+} to M ′M ′′;
(4) if outcome is 0: return M ;
(5) end for
(6) return |⊥〉〈⊥|;
4: output AE,D(1n).
A SKQE is now defined to be weak quantum authenticated encryption (wQAE) secure if for all QPT
adversaries, the two experiments are indistinguishable up to a negligible advantage.
Definition 17. A SKQE Π is wQAE if for all QPT adversaries A it holds:
|Pr [QAE-Real(Π,A, n)→ real]− Pr [wQAE-Ideal(Π,A, n)→ real]| ≤ negl(n).
Analogously we say that a classical scheme is wAE secure if it fulfills the classical restriction of the above
definition (see [3]).
The following theorem shows that the hybrid construction for the symmetric-key case provides wQAE
security when applied to a AE secure SKES and a cDNS secure SKQE. We provide a proof sketch below, the
full proof can be found in the Supplemental Section C.6.
Theorem 12. Let ΠCl be an AE secure SKES and ΠQu a cDNS secure SKQE. Then ΠHybSKQE[Π
Cl, ΠQu] is a
wQAE secure SKQE.
Proof. (sketch.) We begin by defining a hybrid game Hybrid 0, modifying the encryption and decryption
routine. For encryption, we replace the encrypted one-time key k′ used for EncQu by an encryption of a
freshly sampled key k′′ ← KeyGenQu and store (k′, k′′) in a database S. For decryption, we decrypt the
classical part of the ciphertext and check whether the result is equal to one of the k′′ in S. If not, return ⊥,
if so, use the corresponding k′ to decrypt the quantum ciphertext and return the result. Suppose now that
there exists an adversary A that can distinguish QAE-Real and Hybrid 0. Then we can build an adversary
A’ that distinguishes the real and ideal worlds, AE-Real and AE-Ideal, in the real vs ideal characterization of
AE by Shrimpton [15]. This is done by simulating the QAE-Real game played by A, assuming we are in the
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AE-Real world. It turns out that this results in A’ simulating Hybrid 0 when in the AE-Ideal world. Hence
QAE-Real and Hybrid 0 are indistinguishable by the AE security of ΠCl.
We continue to show that the experiments Hybrid 0 and wQAE-Ideal are indistinguishable due to the
cDNS security of ΠQu. We proceed using a standard hybrid method over the encryption queries of A. We
define Hybrid i to replace the quantum plaintext by half of a maximally entangled state for the first i queries,
storing the other half together with the pair (k′, k′′) and the plaintext. For the remaining queries it behaves
like Hybrid 0. The decryption routine behaves like in Hybrid 0, unless the presented one-time key matches
one from the first i queries, then it performs the entanglement check measurement as in wQAE.
Suppose now that A can distinguish Hybrid i and Hybrid (i + 1). Then we can build a cDNS adversary
A’, using the cDNS oracles for the i-th encryption call and corresponding decryption call. Note that this
adversary exactly simulates Hybrid i, but its Broadbent-Waynewright simulator [8] simulates Hybrid (i+1). (It
is easy to see that if there exists a simulator as required by cDNS security, then the Broadbent-Waynewright
simulator works as well.) Therefore we have built a successful adversary against the cDNS security of ΠQu,
a contradiction.
We conclude that Hybrid 0 and Hybrid q are indistinguishable. It remains to show that Hybrid q and
wQAE-Ideal are indistinguishable. This follows by Gentle Measurement [16]: every time the entanglement
test is applied to the current plaintext and an unrelated purification, the state remains unperturbed. uunionsq
B.3 Many-Time, Two-User Security For Hybrid Signcryption
We now prove outsider security of ΠHybQSC
[
ΠSC, ΠSKQE
]
(Construction 1) if ΠSC is an outsider-secure classical
signcryption scheme, and ΠSKQE is a cDNS-secure SKQE. We will do this by showing that the (cDNS-style
version of) outsider security of a QSC (resp., SC) scheme is equivalent to the wQAE (resp., wAE) security of
a derived SKQE (resp., SKES) that is equivalent to the hybrid scheme ΠHybSKQE. Then, we will use Theorem 12
to conclude the proof. We first define a generic way to obtain a SKQE from a QSC, or a SKES from a SC, in
a way that preserves secrecy and unforgeability.
Construction 2. Let Π = (KeyGen,SigEnc,VerDec) be a QSC (SC). We define the SKQE (SKES) Π] =
(K̂eyGen,Enc,Dec) in the following way:
1. K̂eyGen runs KeyGen twice to obtain k = (sdk, vek, sdk′, vek′);
2. Enck runs SigEncsdk,vek′ and appends vek and vek
′, i.e.,
Enck(X) =
(
SigEncsdk,vek′ , vek, vek
′) ;
3. Deck checks whether the second and third part of a ciphertext are equal to vek and vek
′. If one of them
is not, it outputs ⊥, otherwise it runs VerDecsdk′,vek on the first part of the ciphertext.
Lemma 2. Let Π = (KeyGen,SigEnc,VerDec) be a QSC (resp., SC). Then Π] is wQAE (resp., AE) if and
only if Π is many-time, outsider secure (resp., many-time outsider secure in the strong unforgeability sense).
Proof. Let us first look at the classical case. If Π is an outsider secure SC (in the strong unforgeability sense),
then it is by definition strongly unforgeable and IND-CCA2 secure. (Recall that, in the symmetric-key case,
strong unforgeability is called integrity of ciphertexts.) Now note that these properties carry over to Π] using
the following argument. Given a forging or IND-CCA2 adversary A against Π, we can build an adversary
A’ against Π] by making one arbitrary extra query at the beginning to obtain the public keys, and then
running A, ignoring the second and third parts of all ciphertexts. Whenever A submits a ciphertext to the
verified decryption oracle or as a forgery, A’ appends the public keys before submission. A’ has the same
output distribution as A, i.e. the winning probability of the two games is equal. On the other hand, let A
now be an adversary against Π]. We construct an adversary A’ against Π in the following way. A’ runs A,
relaying any encryption queries to the signcryption oracle and appending the public keys to the result. The
same is done in the challenge phase of the IND-CCA2 game, here the challenge plaintext submitted by A
is forwarded as the challenge in the IND-CCA2 game for Π, and when the challenge ciphertext is received,
the public keys are appended. For decryption queries, or forgeries, A’ checks whether the second and third
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parts of the ciphertext are equal to the public keys before relaying it to the decryption oracle, or submitting
it as a forgery, respectively. The observation that AE is equivalent to integrity of ciphertext and IND-CCA2
finishes the proof in the classical case.
Let us now turn to the quantum case. Here the proof is even simpler. The two adversary tranforma-
tions above simulate the Out-Real and Out-Ideal games for Π using oracles provided by the QAE-Real and
wQAE-Ideal games for Π], respectively, and vice versa. uunionsq
As a corollary, we obtain outsider security of the hybrid construction with an outsider-secure SC and a
cDNS secure SKQE.
Corollary 2. Let ΠCl be a many-time, outsider secure SC and let ΠQu be a cDNS-secure SKQE. Then
ΠHybQSC[Π
Cl, ΠQu] is a many-time outsider-secure QSC.
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 12 and Lemma 2, together with the observation that:(
ΠHybQSC[Π
Cl, ΠQu]
)]
= ΠHybQSC
[(
ΠCl
)]
, ΠQu
]
uunionsq
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C SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
C.1 Definition Of DNS And QCA Security
Here we recall the formal definition of DNS one-time quantum authentication [10]. Given an attack map
ΛCB→CB˜ on a scheme Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) (where the adversary holds B and B˜), we define the “effective
attack map” by ΛΠ
MB→MB˜ := E k←KeyGen(1n) [Deck ◦ Λ ◦ Enck] .
Definition 18 ([10]). A SKQE Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is DNS-authenticating if, for all CP-maps ΛCB→CB˜,
there exist CP-maps Λacc
B→B˜ and Λ
rej
B→B˜ that sum to a TP map, such that:∥∥∥ΛΠMB→MB˜ − (idM ⊗ ΛaccB→B˜ + |⊥〉〈⊥|M ⊗ ΛrejB→B˜)∥∥∥ ≤ negl(n) .
We also recall the stronger definition of QCA security [3].
Definition 19. A SKQE Π = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is ciphertext authenticating, or QCA, if for all CP-maps
ΛCB→CB˜, there exists a CP-map Λ
rej
B→B˜ such that:∥∥∥ΛΠMB→MB˜ − (idM ⊗ ΛaccB→B˜ + |⊥〉〈⊥|M ⊗ ΛrejB→B˜)∥∥∥ ≤ negl(n),
and Λacc
B→B˜ + Λ
rej
B→B˜ is TP. Here Λ
acc
B→B˜ is given by:
Λacc
B→B˜(ZB) = Ek,r
[
〈Φk,r|V †k Λ
(
Enck;r
(
φ+MM ′ ⊗ ZB
))
Vk|Φk,r〉
]
where |Φk,r〉 = |φ+〉MM ′ ⊗ |ψ(k,r)〉T .
C.2 Defining Quantum Signature Schemes
In this section we discuss how to properly define in a formal way what a quantum signature scheme should be.
A first attempt would be to translate “quantumly” in the most natural way the usual definition of classical
schemes; that is, trying to define the following.
Definition 20 (Quantum Signature - Wrong Definition). A quantum signature scheme (or QS) with
signing-verifying key space {Sn}n×{Vn}n (where {Sn}n and {Vn}n are family of spaces of bitstrings of size
polynomial in n), message space P and signature space C (both being complex Hilbert spaces of fixed finite
dimension) is a triple of QPT algorithms:
1. (key generation) KeyGen : on input 1n, outputs signing-verifying key pair (sk, vk) ∈ Sn × Vn, where we
assume WLOG that sk includes vk, and vk includes n.
2. (Sign) Sign: on input a signing key sk ∈ Sn and a quantum state µ ∈ D(P), outputs a quantum state
(“quantum signature”) σ ∈ D(C); we write this as σ ← Signsk(µ).
3. (Verify) Ver: on input a verification key vk ∈ Vn, a quantum state µ ∈ D(P), and a quantum signature
σ ∈ D(C), outputs a verification bit b ∈ {acc, rej}; we write this as b← Vervk(µ, σ).
Moreover, the following correctness property must hold:
∀(sk, vk)← KeyGen(1n),∀µ ∈ D(P) =⇒ Pr[Vervk(µ,Signsk(µ))→ rej] ≤ negl(n).
Looking at the above definition, it is clear that there is an issue: the Sign and Ver procedures consume
the message. This is a problem in the quantum setting, given the no-cloning theorem. A natural “fix” would
be to make sure that both the Sign and Ver algorithms output an unmodified copy of the message state.
This would lead to the following.
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Definition 21 (Quantum Signature - Another Wrong Definition). A quantum signature scheme (or
QS) with signing-verifying key space {Sn}n×{Vn}n (where {Sn}n and {Vn}n are family of spaces of bitstrings
of size polynomial in n), message space P and signature space C (both being complex Hilbert spaces of fixed
finite dimension) is a triple of QPT algorithms:
1. (key generation) KeyGen : on input 1n, outputs signing-verifying key pair (sk, vk) ∈ Sn × Vn, where we
assume WLOG that sk includes vk, and vk includes n.
2. (Sign) Sign: on input a signing key sk ∈ Sn and a quantum state µ ∈ D(P), outputs two quantum states:
a quantum message µ′ ∈ D(P) and a quantum signature σ ∈ D(C); we write this as (σ, µ′)← Signsk(µ).
3. (Verify) Ver: on input a verification key vk ∈ Vn, a quantum state µ ∈ D(P), and a quantum signature
σ ∈ D(C), outputs a quantum message µ′ ∈ D(P) and a verification bit b ∈ {acc, rej}; we write this as
(µ′, b)← Vervk(µ, σ).
Moreover, the following correctness properties must hold:
∀(sk, vk)← KeyGen(1n),∀µ ∈ D(P) =⇒
1. Pr[Vervk(Signsk(µ))→ (., rej)] ≤ negl(n)
2. Signsk(µ)→ (µ′, .) =⇒ ‖µ− µ′‖ ≤ negl(n)
3. Vervk(µ, σ)→ (µ′, .) =⇒ ‖µ− µ′‖ ≤ negl(n)
It is easy to notice that this definition also has a lot of problems. First of all, condition 2. above is too
strong, as it implies that the signature cannot be (in any noticeable way) correlated with the message state
itself. This would make the goal of achieving any reasonable security notion hopeless. Condition 3. is also
unnecessarily strong, as it requires that the original state is recovered even when verification fails. This finally
leads to the following definition, which we adopted in Section 3.1.
Definition 22 (Restated Definition 5).
A quantum signature scheme (or QS) is a triple of QPT algorithms:
1. (key generation) KeyGen(1n) : output (sk, vk) ∈ KS ×KV.
2. (sign) Sign : KS ×D(HM )→ D(HC)
3. (verify) Ver : KV ×D(HC)→ D(HM ⊕ |⊥〉) .
Moreover, the following correctness properties must hold:
‖Vervk ◦ Signsk − idM ⊕ 0⊥‖ ≤ negl(n)
for all (sk, vk)← KeyGen(1n).
C.3 Proof Of Theorem 5
First, insider security follows from the QIND-CPA security of the hybrid PKQE construction (i.e. Theorem 6)
and the fact that cDNS implies QIND.
Let A be an outside attacker that prepares a quantum state %(vekR,vekS)MB upon input (vekR, vekS), and
attacks the ciphertext it receives with an attack channel ΛCB→CB . We can assume without loss of generality
that Λ is independent of vekR and vekS . This is because any dependency can be removed by redefining
%
(vekR,vekS)
MB to include a copy of the public keys in the B register and having Λ read it from there. Here
C = CQuCCl is the ciphertext space of the scheme ΠHybQSC[Π
SC, ΠSKQE], where CQu and CCl are a quantum
and a classical register, respectively. Let σ
(vekR,vekS)
CB = SigEncvekR,sdkS
(
%
(vekR,vekS)
MB
)
be the ciphertext A
receives, and let cCl be it’s classical part. Let further σˆ
(vekR,vekS)
CB = ΛCB→CB
(
σ
(vekR,vekS)
CB
)
, and let cˆCl be
the classical part7 of σˆ
(vekR,vekS)
CB . We first observe that if cˆ
Cl 6= cCl, VerDecsdkR,vekS rejects with overwhelming
7 For simplicity of exposition we assume here that CCl is a classical register that can only hold classical information
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probability due to the unforgeability of the classical signcryption scheme. Let now c˜Cl = SigEncSCvekR,sdkS (k˜)
with k˜ ← KeyGenSKQE(1n). We note that σ(vekR,vekS)CB and σ˜(vekR,vekS)CB are indistinguishable for A, where
σ˜
(vekR,vekS)
CB is equal to σ
(vekR,vekS)
CB except that c
Cl is replaced with c˜Cl. In particular, c˜Cl is unchanged with the
same probability when ΛCB→CB is applied to σˆ
(vekR,vekS)
CB as c
Cl is when ΛCB→CB is applied to σ
(vekR,vekS)
CB , up
to negligible difference. Suppose now that A breaks the outsider security of ΠHybQSC[ΠSC, ΠSKQE], i.e. suppose
that there is no simulator as required by Definition 9. Then it is easy to check that the attack map Λ′CQuB′
with side information register B′ = BCClK that
1. applies ΛCB , and
2. discards register CCl
breaks cDNS security of ΠSKQE: When the input state
%′MBCClK = %MB ⊗ SigEncsdkS ,vekR
(
k˜
)
⊗ (sdkS , vekS , sdkR, vekR)
with (sdki, veki)← KeyGenSC for i = S,R and k˜ ← KeyGenSKQE is supplied, this attack simulates the attack
A against ΠHybQSC[ΠSC, ΠSKQE]. uunionsq
C.4 Proof Of Theorem 11
Let A = (A1,A2) be an adversary playing QCCA2-Test. We will go through a game hopping, where the
winning probability of the adversary always increases (or decreases at most negligibly), up to an experiment
which is equivalent to QwCCA2-Fake. First of all, we restate the two experiments explicitly.
Experiment 10. The QCCA2-Test(Π,A, n) experiment:
1: C runs (dk, ek)← KeyGen(1n) and flips a coin b $←−{0, 1};
2: A1 receives ek and oracle access to Decdk;
3: A1 prepares a side register S, and sends to C a challenge register M ;
4: C puts into C either Encek(M) (if b = 0) or Encek(τM ) (if b = 1);
5: A2 receives registers C and S and oracle access to Decdk;
6: A2 outputs a bit b′. If b′ = b, output win; otherwise output rej.
Experiment 11. The QwCCA2-Fake(Π,A, n) experiment:
1: C runs (dk, ek)← KeyGen(1n);
2: A1 receives ek and oracle access to Decdk;
3: A1 prepares a side register S, and sends to C a challenge register M ;
4: C discards M , prepares |φ+〉M ′M ′′ , and stores M ′′; then C encrypts M ′ (using ek) and puts the resulting
ciphertext into C ′;
5: A2 receives registers C ′ and S and oracle access to Ddk, where Ddk is defined as follows. On input a
register C:
(1) C applies Decdk to C, places result in M ;
(2) C applies {Π+,1−Π+} to MM ′′;
(3) if the outcome is 1 then: abort and output cheat; else return M ;
6: C draws a bit b at random. If b = 1, output cheat; if b = 0 output rej.
We start now with the game-hopping.
Game 0: this is just QCCA2-Test.
Game 1: as Game 0, except that C will prepare two entangled registers |φ+〉M ′M ′′ ; then if b = 1 instead
of encrypting the maximally mixed state τM , he will discard M and return to A the encryption of M ′
instead. Clearly the winning probability of A is unaffected by this, otherwise A could distinguish τM from
φ+M ′ without access to φ
+
M ′′ .
Game 2: as Game 1, but instead of oracle access to Decdk, A2 gets access to a modified oracle D′dk which,
on input a ciphertext register C, does the following:
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1. applies Decdk to C, places result in M ;
2. applies {Π+,1−Π+} to MM ′′;
3. if the outcome is 1 then: abort game and output win; else return M ;
Notice that D′dk is the same as Ddk in QwCCA2-Fake, except it aborts with win instead of cheat whenever
it detects a challenge plaintext replay. Clearly, the probability of A of winning this game does not decrease
in respect to the previous game, hence so far we have:
Pr [A wins Game 2] ≥ Pr [A wins QCCA2-Test] .
Game 3: as Game 2, but C “blinds” the classical part of the challenge ciphertext, replacing it with a
different one, and D′dk is modified in order to undo the blinding whenever queried on the fake ciphertext,
making the substitution transparent to the adversary. The experiment looks as follows.
Experiment 12. The Game 3(Π,A, n) experiment:
1: C runs (dk, ek)← KeyGen(1n), prepares entangled registers |φ+〉M ′M ′′ , and flips a bit b $←− {0, 1};
2: A1 receives ek and oracle access to Decdk;
3: A1 prepares a side register S, and sends to C a challenge register M ;
4: if b = 1, then: C discards M and replaces it with M ′;
5: C encrypts M (using ek), puts the resulting ciphertext into C, and records the classical part (PKE
ciphertext) t of the resulting ciphertext;
6: C generates a fresh one-time key k′ ← KeyGenSKQE(1n);
7: C encrypts t′ ← EncPKEek (k′), records t′, and replaces the classical t with t′ in the ciphertext register C;
8: A2 receives registers C and S and oracle access to Dtdk, where Dtdk is defined as follows. On input a
register C:
(1) measure the classical-subsystem part of C: if the outcome is t′ then: replace the classical-subsystem
part of C with |t〉〈t|;
(2) applies Decdk to C, places result in M ;
(3) applies {Π+,1−Π+} to MM ′′;
(4) if the outcome is 1 then: abort game and output win; else return M ;
9: A2 outputs a bit b′. If b′ = b, output win; otherwise output fail.
Notice that, since in the algorithm Dec of ΠHyb the first step is to measure the classical part of the register
C, the new measurement introduced by Dtdk does not disturb A’s behavior. Moreover, the substitution of
t with t′ is undetectable for A, otherwise we could build a reduction B against the IND-CCA2 security of
ΠPKE, in the following way:
1. B plays the IND-CCA2 game against CCCA2 (for a secrept bit b), simulating C for A in the obvious way
(forwarding ek, simulating Dec by decrypting classical keys with his own DecPKEdk oracle and then doing
the SKQE decryption himself).
2. During the challenge from A, B generates a fresh k and uses it as a challenge to CCCA2, receiving back a
ciphertext t;
3. Now flip a coin b′ $←− {0, 1} to decide whether for the rest of the game B will try to simulate Game 2
(b′ = 0) or Game 3 (b′ = 0) for A. In the first case just return to A the correctly formed ciphertext
register C, and simulate decryption queries on t-parts by defining their decryption as k. In the latter case
instead, generate a fake encryption t′, modify C accordingly before returning it to A, and then simulate
a “blinded” oracle Dtdk by decrypting t
′-part queries as k.
4. Finally, look at A’s output. If adver guesses b′ correctly, then B guesses b = 0, otherwise guesses b at
random.
The reduction works because if b = 0, then we are simulating for A correctly either Game 2 or Game 3
(depending on b′). By assumption, in this case A should be able to guess correctly b′ with non-negligible
advantage, otherwise his guess will be unrelated to b. Therefore, we have:
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Pr [A wins Game 3] ≥ Pr [A wins Game 2]− negl .
Also notice that, at this point, A has no information whatsoever about the key k used to encrypt the
quantum part of the challenge, because the encryption of k was blinded with another, unrelated one by the
modified oracle Dtdk. This observation will be important in the next game hop, because the definition of
DNS security (and of the computational variant cDNS) argues about adversaries averaged over the secret
key used.
Game 4: as Game 3, but this time C always replaces the challenge plaintext register M with the entangled
half φ+M ′ , regardless of b. We show that this replacement cannot be efficiently detected. Clearly, if b = 1
nothing changes for A. If b = 0 instead, the quantum part of the challenge ciphertext received back by A is
now an encryption (through ΠSKQE) of the register M ′ for a secret key k unknown to A by the reasoning
made in the last game.
Then, consider any query to Dtdk performed by A2. Such query can be seen as a convex combination
of: a query state which does not depend on the challenge (and hence does not change the win probability),
and the output of an attack map acting on the challenge ciphertext and an internal adversarial state S.
By the cDNS security of ΠSKQE, such an attack map is (up to a negligible factor) a convex combination of
two maps: the one which replaces the underlying plaintext with |⊥〉〈⊥| (and hence independent from the
challenge plaintext, so again does not change the win probability), and the one which acts as the identity,
and leaves the underlying plaintext untouched. However, this latter map would produce a query which is
detected as φ+M ′ by D
t
dk, and would thus cause the adversary to win. Hence we have:
Pr [A wins Game 6] ≥ Pr [A wins Game 5]− negl .
Game 5: as Game 4, but we remove the “t blinding” feature from the simulated oracle Dtdk. That is, we
replace Dtdk back with D
′
dk. This replacement is undetectable for the same reasoning as in Game 3.
Game 6: this is like Game 5, except that:
1. D′dk is replaced by Ddk (i.e., aborts with cheat instead of win);
2. C does not flip the random bit b; and
3. on A’s output, regardless of the outcome, we declare A to cheat or to rej with 50/50 probability.
Notice that this final game is equivalent to QwCCA2-Fake. In fact, by now A’s output is completely
unrelated to b. Combining all inequalities, we have shown:
Pr [A cheats in QwCCA2-Fake] ≥ Pr [A wins QCCA2-Test]− negl,
which proves finally that ΠHyb is QIND-wCCA2 secure. uunionsq
C.5 “Full” Ciphertext (cQCA-Based) Version Of CCA2 Security For Public-Key Quantum
Encryption
We show here the “correct” (strongest) formulation of quantum CCA2 security for the public-key setting by
using the framework from Section B.1 and extending in a natural way the work done in [3]. We recall that,
in particular, this formulation has the advantage that it closely matches “in spirit” the classical version of
IND-CCA2 by disallowing replay of the challenge ciphertext in a strict quantum sense, where detection of a
replay is done by exploiting QCA-based quantum ciphertext integrity. The drawback is that the use of such
formulation in actual security proofs relies on a characterization of quantum encryption schemes given by a
decomposition of the encryption/decryption procedure in terms of operators Vk and Πk,r, where k (which
in our case can be thought w.l.o.g. as the pair (dk, ek)) is the underlying QCA authentication key (see [3]
for details). One can prove that such decomposition always exists, but the necessary characterization here
requires that this decomposition is efficient (Condition 1). There is currently no known counterexample of
a quantum encryption scheme (either symmetric- or public-key) where this is not the case. Regardless, as
shown in [3], this approach has many advantages, even if strictly speaking it can only be used on quantum
encryption schemes which fulfill the characterization.
We start by recalling again the unrestricted quantum CCA2 experiment.
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Experiment 13. The QCCA2-Test(Π,A, n) experiment:
1: C runs (dk, ek)← KeyGen(1n) and flips a coin b $←−{0, 1};
2: A1 receives ek and access to oracle Decdk;
3: A1 prepares a side (state) register S, and sends C a challenge register M ;
4: C puts into C either Encek(M) (if b = 0) or Encek(τM ) (if b = 1);
5: A2 receives registers C and S and oracle access to Decdk;
6: A2 outputs a bit b′. If b′ = b, output win; otherwise output fail.
Notice that in this game there are no restrictions on the use of Decdk by A2. In particular, A2 is free
to decrypt the challenge. In the second game, the challenge plaintext is replaced by half of a maximally
entangled state, and A only gains an advantage over guessing if he cheats, i.e., if he tries to decrypt the
challenge.
Experiment 14. The QCCA2-Fake(Π,A, n) experiment:
1: C runs k ← KeyGen(1n);
2: A1 receives n and access to oracles Enck and Deck;
3: A1 prepares a side register S, and sends C a challenge register M ;
4: C discards M , prepares |φ+〉M ′M ′′ and fresh randomness r, and stores (M ′′, r); then C encrypts the M ′
register and sends the resulting ciphertext C ′ to A2;
5: A2 receives registers C ′ and S and oracles Enck and Dk, where Dk is defined as follows. On input a
register C:
(1) C applies V †k to C, places results in MT ;
(2) C applies {PσkT ,1− PσkT } to T ;
(3) if outcome is 0 then:
(4) C applies {Πk,r,1−Πk,r} to T ;
(5) if outcome is 0 then:
(6) C applies {Π+,1−Π+} to MM ′′;
(7) if outcome is 0: output cheat;
(8) end if
(9) else
(10) apply the default map for invalid ciphertexts, i.e., Dˆk to M .
(11) end if
(12) return M ;
6: C draws a bit b at random. If b = 1, output cheat; if b = 0 output reject.
We now define QIND-CCA2 in terms of the advantage gap of adversaries between the above two games.8
Definition 23. A PKQE Π is QIND-CCA2 if, for all QPT adversaries A,
Pr[QCCA2-Test(Π,A, n)→ win]− Pr[QCCA2-Fake(Π,A, n)→ cheat] ≤ negl(n) .
The omission of absolute values in the above is intentional. Indeed, an adversary can artificially inflate his
cheating probability by querying the decryption oracle on the challenge and then ignoring the result. What
he should not be able to do (against a secure scheme) is make his win probability larger than his cheating
probability.
Separation and implication results follow the same strategy of [3], which we refer the reader to. We only
recall here the following.
Proposition 3. Let Π be a QIND-CCA2 secure PKQES. Then it is in particular also QIND-CCA1 and
QIND-CPA.
8 The interface that the two games provide to the adversary differ slightly in that the adversary is not asked to
output a bit in the end of the QCCA2-Fake game. This is not a problem as the games have the same interface until
the second one terminates.
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Moreover, following a similar strategy as in Theorem 11, we have the following.
Theorem 13. Select the following:
• An IND-CCA2 PKE scheme ΠPKE;
• A cQCA secure SKQE ΠSKQE.
Then ΠHybPKQE[Π
PKE, ΠSKQE] is a QIND-CCA2 PKQE.
C.6 Proof Of Theorem 12
We have to show that the games QAE-Ideal and wQAE-Real using the scheme ΠHyb[ΠCl, ΠQu] are indistin-
guishable for any QPT adversary A. We begin by defining a hybrid game in the following way:
Experiment 15. The experiment Hybrid 0:
1: k ← KeyGen(1n) ;
2: define channel EM→C as follows:
(1) run EncHybk on M , put result in registers C
QuC ′Cl;
(2) sample k′′ ← KeyGenQu place EncClk (k′′) in CCl;
(3) store (C ′Cl, k′′) in a set S;
(4) return (CQu, CCl).
3: define channel DC→M as follows:
(1) for each (C ′Cl, C ′′Cl) ∈ S do:
(2) compute k˜ by running DecClk on C
Cl;
(3) if k˜ = k′′j : then
(4) apply DecHyb to (CQu, C ′Cl), place result in M output M ;
(5) end if
(6) end for
(7) return |⊥〉〈⊥|.
4: output AE,D(1n).
Suppose now first there exists an adversary A that can distinguish QAE-Real and Hybrid 0. Then we
can build an adversary A’ that distinguishes the real and ideal worlds, AE-Real and AE-Ideal, in the real vs
ideal characterization of AE by Shrimpton [15]. A’ runs A, answering its queries in the following way. On
an encryption query with register M , sample k′ ← KeyGenQu and encrypt M with EncQuk′ to obtain CQu.
Now send k′ to the encryption oracle and put the result into CCl. Return (CQu, CCl). For a decryption query
with register C = (CQu, CCl), decrypt the contents of CCl using the decrytion oracle and use the result k′ to
decrypt the contents of CQu into M . Return M . It is easy to see that A’ uses the experiment AE-Real for
ΠCl to make A play QAE-Real, and the experiment AE-Ideal for ΠCl to make A play Hybrid 0. Hence the
indistinguishability between QAE-Real and Hybrid 0 follows from the AE security of ΠCl.
We continue to show that the experiments Hybrid 0 and wQAE-Ideal are indistinguishable due to the cDNS
security of ΠQu. First observe that ΠCl is in particular IND-CPA secure, and therefore randomized. More
precisely it holds that for c ← EncClk and c′ ← EncClk , the probability of c = c′ is negligible. Let us therefore
assume that the ciphertexts in S in Hybrid 0 are all distinct. It follows that for each decryption oracle call,
there is at most one entry in (C ′Cl, C ′′Cl) ∈ S such that CCl = C ′′Cl. Let A be an adversary against the wQAE
security of ΠHyb, and assume that it makes q encryption queries. We build q hybrid experiments as follows:
Experiment 16. The experiment Hybrid i:
1: k ← KeyGen(1n) ;
2: define a stateful channel EM→C as follows:
(1) let j − 1 be the number of times EM→C has been called before;
(2) If j ≤ i move content of M to M ′j , prepare |φ+〉MjM ′′j , store (M ′j ,M ′′j ) in M;
(3) run EncHybk on M , put result in registers C
QuC ′Clj ;
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(4) sample k′′j ← KeyGenQu place EncClk (k′′j ) in CCl;
(5) store (C ′Clj , k
′′
j ) in a set S;
(6) return (CQu, CCl).
3: define channel DC→M as follows:
(1) for each (C ′Cli , C
′′Cl
i ) ∈ S do:
(2) compute k˜ by running DecClk on C
Cl;
(3) if k˜ = k′′j : then
(4) apply DecHyb to (CQu, C ′Cl), place result in M ;
(5) if j ≤ i: then
(6) measure |φ+〉〈φ+| vs. 1−|φ+〉〈φ+| on MM ′′j ; if outcome is 0 swap M and M ′j , else prepare
|⊥〉〈⊥|M ;
(7) end if
(8) output M .
(9) end if
(10) end for
(11) return |⊥〉〈⊥|.
4: output AE,D(1n).
Suppose now that A can distinguish Hybrid i and Hybrid (i+ 1). Then we can build a cDNS adversary A’
in the obvious way: A’ simulates Hybrid i with A until before the (i+ 1)-th query to prepare an input state.
The attack map consists of continuing to simulate Hybrid i with A until there is a decryption query with a
decrypted one-time key k˜ matching k′′i+1. If no such query occurs, prepare a random ciphertext and ignore
the output of the decryption. Otherwise, continue to simulate Hybrid i with A to the end. Now note that this
adversary exactly simulates Hybrid i, but its Broadbent-Waynewright simulator [8] simulates9 Hybrid (i+ 1).
Therefore we have built a successful adversary against the cDNS security of ΠQu, a contradiction. We
conclude that Hybrid 0 and Hybrid q are indistinguishable. It remains to show that Hybrid q and wQAE-Ideal
are indistinguishable. This follows by an application of the Gentle Measurement Lemma [16]: while Hybrid
q first checks which register M ′′ should be used together with the decrypted quantum plaintext to measure
|φ+〉〈φ+| vs. 1 − |φ+〉〈φ+| by means of comparing k˜ and the k′′s, wQAE-Ideal just tries them one by one.
For the ones that do not fit, though, this measurement yields ”not maximally entangled” with overwhelming
probability, and the gentle measurement lemma implies that the decrypted plaintext is not disturbed (see
also the discussion in Section 5.1). uunionsq
C.7 Explanatory example for Condition 1
Condition 1 is weaker than the analogous condition from [3] where it is required that Vk is efficiently
implementable on all inputs. The results of that paper also hold for all schemes satisfying this weaker
Condition 1. As discussed in [3], all known SKQE schemes satisfy Condition 1.
For example, let’s look at whyΠHybPKQE satisfies Condition 1, provided that the same holds for the underlying
SKQE. Let ΠQ be the SKQE and Π
Cl the classical PKE. Suppose ΠQu satisfies
Enck;r(XM ) = Vk
(
XM ⊗ |ψ(k,r)〉〈ψ(k,r)|T
)
V †k .
for some efficiently-prepareable |ψ(k,r)〉 and an Vk. Consider the following way of implementing encryption
of the combined scheme ΠHybSKQE[Π
Qu, ΠCl]. Here rC , k, rQ denote uniformly random classical strings which
are (respectively) the randomness for ΠCl encryption, a key for ΠQu, and randomness for ΠQu.
% 7−→ %⊗ |k〉〈k|K ⊗ |EncCek;rC (k)〉〈EncCek;rC (k)| ⊗ |ψk,rQ〉〈ψk,rQ |
7−→ TrK
(
|k〉〈k|K ⊗ |EncCek;rC (k)〉〈EncCek;rC (k)| ⊗ Vk(%⊗ |ψk,rQ〉〈ψk,rQ |)V †k
)
9 It is easy to see that if there exists a simulator as required by cDNS security, then the Broadbent-Waynewright
simulator works as well.
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Here, the first step attaches the auxiliary state to %, and the second step implements a unitary V Πk (on
relevant inputs.) We emphasize that both steps are efficiently implementable. Note that, despite the fact
that (for these particular inputs) we implemented V Πk by tracing out a register, it is still the case that V
Π
k
is a unitary operator. Indeed, V Πk is invertible because k can be extracted from Enc
C
ek;rC (k); of course, to do
this efficiently one needs dk.
D The multiuser outsider security experiments
In this section, we proved the definition of the multi-user outsider security experiments. In the following, we
will describe the adversary as a two-stage adversary (A1,A2.
Experiment 17. The multi-user real outsider experiment M-Out-Real(Π,A, n):
1: for every IDP ∈ I do: (sdkP , vekP )← KeyGen(1n, IDP ).
2: A gets as input 1n, I, and the list of all public keys {vekP } for all IDP ∈ I;
3: A outputs two identities S,R ∈ I;
4: A receives the list of all secret keys {sdkP } for all IDP ∈ I \ {S,R};
5: return the output of ASigEncS,R,VerDecS,R .
Experiment 18. The multi-user ideal outsider experiment M-Out-Ideal(Π,A, n):
1: for every IDP ∈ I do: (sdkP , vekP )← KeyGen(1n, IDP ).
2: A gets as input 1n, I, and the list of all public keys {vekP } for all IDP ∈ I;
3: A outputs two identities S,R ∈ I;
4: A receives the list of all secret keys {sdkP } for all IDP ∈ I \ {S,R};
5: define channel EM→C :
(1) prepare |φ+〉M ′M ′′ , store (M ′′,M) in a set M;
(2) apply SigEncS,R to M
′; return result.
6: define channel DC→M :
(1) apply VerDecS,R to C, place results in M
′;
(2) for each (M ′′,M) ∈M do:
(3) apply {Π+,1−Π+} to M ′M ′′;
(4) if outcome is 0: return M ;
(5) end for
(6) return |⊥〉〈⊥|;
7: return the output of AE,D.
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